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1
Beyond Compliance
Abstract: This book explores how ethics in organization can 
draw on research streams in moral philosophy and moral 
psychology in order to attune to the actual and concrete 
moral dilemmas in the workplace. Compliance activities in 
organizations often include ethical training of employees 
and formulations of codes of conduct to define required and 
expected behaviour. In order to prepare leaders and employees 
for moral dilemmas in their professional lives, organizations 
need to go beyond compliance and acknowledge the 
complexity and ambiguity of the situations the employees can 
face. Familiarity with ethical tools, principles, and concepts 
can be part of a foundation for responsible decision-making, 
but only in tandem with empirical knowledge from social and 
moral psychology about judgement and decision-making.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0003.
OPEN
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We can understand moral reasoning at work to be the activity of judging 
and deciding what is morally right and wrong, permissible, obligatory, 
and forbidden in an organizational context. We can also place the activ-
ity under the heading of ethics in organizations. This book proposes a 
rethink of the assumptions this activity rests upon, in order to strengthen 
its potential to create responsible conduct in the workplace. It combines 
research streams in moral philosophy and in moral psychology to outline 
how it can be possible to attune ethics in organizations to the everyday 
tensions and dilemmas experienced by leaders and employees in work 
settings.
Three assumptions about ethics in organizations will be under scru-
tiny in this book. There are elements of truth in all of them, but they also 
tend to overshadow important aspects of the decision-making processes 
in organizations. The first assumption is that the development of skills to 
engage in ethical analysis can effectively prepare leaders and employees 
for the ethical challenges they will face at work. The second assumption 
is that decision-making should ideally rest with people of strong moral 
character, that is, with those who have a stable disposition to behave in 
a morally responsible manner, even when they are under pressure to 
do otherwise. The third and final assumption is that codes of conduct 
strengthen an organization’s ability to deal with ethically challenging 
situations. The underlying problem with these three assumptions is that 
even an organization where the leaders and employees have been through 
ethical training and become familiar with ethical analysis, where the 
individuals are of reasonably good moral character, and where a detailed 
and concrete code of conduct is in place, is vulnerable to internal moral 
wrongdoing. In this book, I will attempt to address the limitations of 
the three assumptions, and show how the combination of insights from 
moral philosophy and moral psychology can create a more robust ethics 
in organizations.
Moral dilemmas are a pervasive feature in organizational life, and 
the discipline of ethics offers principles, tools, and concepts to analyse 
them and reach a decision about what to do. A moral dilemma is typi-
cally a situation where the decision-maker must choose between two 
or more options that represent some moral requirement or duty. The 
decision affects a range of stakeholders, and several of them can have 
reasonable moral claims to make on the decision-maker, but some of 
them will be disappointed. A moral dilemma is a choice between wrong 
and wrong. Something of moral value will be lost, no matter what the 
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 decision-maker opts to do. Leaders and employees from the private as 
well as the public sector can experience that they spend their professional 
lives in a moral minefield. No matter where they put their feet, a moral 
dilemma can lay hidden and spring up to demand a swift response from 
them. In the process of rethinking ethic in organizations we should be 
guided by a fundamental respect and understanding of the predicament 
of individuals who work under such conditions. Leadership research 
documents how important it is for employee motivation to experience 
that leaders stand by their side and are supportive when they face the 
most stressful and demanding situations, and moral dilemmas are 
concrete instances where such presence is pivotal. What individuals in 
professions as dissimilar as being a business manager and a social worker 
have in common is that they make decisions that can have considerable 
dramatic impact on other people. Their integrity, empathy, and common 
sense can be questioned and under pressure on a daily basis. Ethical 
perspectives on what goes on in organizations need to reflect the intense 
moral tensions experienced by the decision-makers who operate there.
Ethics training has become an integral part of leadership and employee 
development programs in many organizations. Companies who are 
about to establish business in some of the most corrupt areas of the 
world, send their people to anti-corruption training to prepare them for 
the realities they are about to face there. In many countries, professionals 
like accountants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, nurses, and financial advi-
sors have ethical training as part of their obligatory continuing educa-
tion. The expressed purpose of all these learning activities is to make the 
participants better equipped to meet ethically challenging situations at 
work. However, the distance between the harmonious teaching settings 
in the seminar room and the tense and complex realities the participants 
face in their everyday work life can be considerable.
I have facilitated ethics sessions in organizations internationally for 15 
years. In my experience, the commitment from participants and their 
bosses can range from intense all the way down to stone cold. In some 
organizations, ethics training becomes an arena for lively discussion of 
a broad range of professional issues, going well beyond the ethical. In 
others, the activity takes the form of compliance work that one reluc-
tantly puts on the agenda and participates in with minimal engagement 
and effort. One accounting firm defines the main goal of an ethics course 
as fulfilling the requirement of having seven hours of ethics teaching for 
its partners. Not a word about substantial learning outcomes regarding 
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the ability to cope with ethical challenges at work. If a company or group 
of professionals establish a code of conduct and invite their people to 
an ethics seminar, they can tick those two boxes on the compliance list. 
If things nevertheless go wrong, and individuals from the company 
become entangled in wrongdoing, the leadership can claim that those 
people have acted on their own behalf and not in accordance with the 
intentions expressed during the ethics training. In the courtroom, it can 
make a significant difference to the outcome for a company whether 
the employee who has bribed a public official on their behalf has been 
through ethical training or not. If he has, the company can distance itself 
from the critical event and claim that the person acted on his or her own, 
even though it has intentionally sent the employee on a mission into an 
area where wrongdoing appears to be inescapable. Incentives can be at 
odds with the messages from the ethics seminars, and the employees are 
expected to cope with that internal conflict.
Some of the ethical training sessions I have facilitated have been in 
the oil and gas industry. Since the early 1970s, my home country Norway 
has benefitted greatly from its natural resources in the North Sea. The 
income has financed the development of a well-functioning society, with 
excellent infrastructure in transport, health, and education. Norwegian 
oil and gas companies have also gradually developed competence and 
skills that have enabled them to pursue and establish business in other 
countries. Some of the world’s richest oil and gas resources happen to be 
located in areas where corruption is commonplace, and the Norwegian 
companies have faced dilemmas in coping with that dimension of real-
ity. In 2004, the company Statoil admitted that it had paid 15.2 million 
dollars to the son of the former president of Iran, with the aim of secur-
ing lucrative contracts in that country. As a result, the Chairman, the 
CEO, and the Director for international operations resigned, and the 
company received a heavy fine.1
In the aftermath of the Statoil scandal, companies of all sizes and 
shapes in the oil and gas industry sat down to fine-tune their codes of 
conduct, and invited leaders and employees to a range of extensive ethics 
seminars. I contributed to a series of these, in judgement and decision-
making sessions focusing on how to cope with realistic dilemmas. The 
CEO of one of the companies participated on every session, and gave 
an introductory talk at each of them. His main message to his travel-
ling employees was: “Make sure you keep at arm’s length from anything 
that smells of corruption.” After that, he wished them a safe journey to 
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Azerbaijan, Angola, Nigeria, and other countries where the company 
had activities.
How much should top management back home know about the 
complexities of business life and the level of corruption in the countries 
where their companies are active? When corruption cases come to trail, 
one of the key issues is often to settle whether top management knew 
about the transactions taking place. Legally, it is not enough to establish 
that they did not know. They may have chosen the stance of willful blind-
ness, which involves taking conscious steps not to know, deciding not to 
inquire about how the company won a particular contract, which agents 
were involved, and about the details of the methods they deployed to get 
the attention of the local decision-makers. A CEO can decide to turn 
a blind eye to the details of the business culture and business methods 
his company partakes in, but that strategy is both ethically and legally 
dubious.
One group of professionals who have come under critical scrutiny after 
the financial crisis in 2008 is that of financial advisors. They have come 
under criticism for recommending and selling questionable products 
to their customers. The response from financial authorities in Norway 
and in other countries has been to tighten the control of the institutions, 
and to demand that the financial advisors participate in ethical training. 
I have contributed to this activity at the business school where I work, 
by introducing ethical theories and concepts to financial advisors, and 
inviting them to apply them to practical cases.
The creditable aim with these activities is to encourage ethical aware-
ness in the profession, and make the participants familiar with analytical 
tools with which to weight and consider their options. However, my 
impression is that the incentives these individuals encounter at work 
remain more or less unchanged, which means that the ethical training 
makes little difference to how they behave towards their customers. 
I ask the financial advisors what they would say to a customer under 
the following circumstances: Anne has recently inherited 200,000 Euro 
from an aunt, and turns up for financial guidance. The advisor looks at 
Anne’s overall financial situation, and believes that the smartest thing 
this woman can do, clearly is to use the entire inheritance to reduce her 
debt. However, this option will not give the advisor or his company any 
profits. He has a strong personal incentive to go against his own judge-
ment of what would be the best option for Anne, and advise her is to 
spend the money on an investment package. What should he do?
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When I put this question to the financial advisors, many of them appear 
to experience what I in this book will call moral dissonance, a discrepancy 
between their moral convictions what they are tempted or ordered to do. 
On the one hand, they want to live in accordance the professional stand-
ard indicated in the title of being a financial advisor. Their primary goal 
should be to serve the client, the secondary goal to make profits. From a 
moral point of view, then, they realize that they should be honest to their 
customers and state frankly what they think would serve their personal 
economies best. On the other hand, their own income depends on sales of 
financial products, and their employers expect them to show good results. 
Anne may enter their office the day before the personal sales report for the 
month is due, and the advisor can be in a position where a sale to Anne 
will have a big positive impact on what happens in the meeting with the 
supervisor. In similarity to the corruption cases, top management seems 
to choose willful blindness over detailed knowledge of the practical conse-
quences of the incentives they present to their employees, in the shape of 
the conversations that go on between their employees and customers.
Conflicts of interest are at the core of many ethical challenges in organi-
zations (Nanda, 2002ii). The financial advisor can decide to give priority to 
his or her self-interest and the employer’s interest ahead of the customer’s 
interest, with very little risk of detection. A similar pattern is present in 
relations between professionals and their clients, customers, students, 
and patients in other setting. These situations are different from moral 
dilemmas, in that they do not pose a choice between options that are more 
or less on equal moral footing. They are not choices between wrong and 
wrong, but between one option that is morally obligatory and right, and 
another option that is tempting, but morally wrong. Professionals often 
have strong incentives to choose the morally wrong options, and when 
they found out, face stern moral criticism. The public tends to expect and 
demand strength of character in the professionals, a disposition to with-
stand temptation to exploit their superior knowledge for personal gain. 
Studies in social psychology suggest that this reliance upon character is 
misplaced, and that organizations should instead attend to the incentives 
employees have for balancing between self-interest and client interest.
This book presents two streams of research and inquiry to support 
a rethink of ethics in organizations. The first is moral philosophy and 
ethics, which contributes with analytic tools to handle moral dilemmas 
and other challenging situations at work. I draw on classical contribu-
tions from Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart 
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Mill, and contemporary input from Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, as well as a variety of more specific works in business ethics 
and organizational ethics. A central and original component in the book 
is the Navigation Wheel, a tool I have designed in collaboration with 
philosopher Einar Øverenget (Kvalnes and Øverenget, 2012). Decision-
makers can use the Wheel to keep track of the legal, ethical, value-
oriented, moral, reputational, and economical dimensions of a decision. I 
have used in ethical teaching settings in a range of organizations, and the 
participants have appreciated it as a simple and practical tool with which 
to structure a conversation about right and wrong in work contexts.
The second stream of research is from moral and social psychology, in 
tandem with criminology. It explores the foundations of moral agency, 
and attempts to identify the primary causes of moral wrongdoing. The 
traditional virtue ethics approach has been to explain moral transgres-
sions and misconduct in terms of character defects. A person who gives 
in to temptation and prioritizes personal wealth over the legitimate 
claims of clients and customers, is seen as a person of weak character, 
someone who has not developed a strong and stable disposition to do the 
right thing. An alternative circumstance approach has developed from 
experimental studies in social psychology, which indicate that aspects of 
a situation can have more predictive power in terms of right- or wrongdo-
ing than information about the decision-makers personality or character 
traits. Individuals may move from initial moral dissonance when facing 
an option that goes against their moral convictions, to acceptance of that 
option, through a process of moral neutralization. Circumstances, in 
terms of organizational climate and norms of communication amongst 
colleagues, can crucially affect whether a decision-maker either remains 
loyal to his or her moral beliefs, or convinces him- or herself that it is 
acceptable after all to choose that option. The main instigators to this 
research stream have been Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1986).
The major ethical scandals in business (Enron, Arthur Andersen, 
Parmalat) have all involved not just moral but also criminal wrongdoing. 
Ethics in organizations can thus learn from criminological studies of why 
people engage in lawbreaking activities. According to Heath (2008, p. 
611), individual decision-makers “do not commit crimes because they lack 
expertise in the application of the categorical imperative or the felicific 
calculus. They are more likely to commit crimes because they have talked 
themselves into believing some type of excuse for their actions, and they 
have found a social environment in which this sort of excuse is accepted or 
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encouraged.” Organizations can set out to build a communication climate 
where it normal to challenge colleagues’ justifications and excuses and 
people are encouraged to express their moral concerns and stay loyal to 
their moral commitments. In doing so, familiarity with Immanuel Kant’s 
categorical imperative and other ethical concepts may actually be useful 
in articulating a position and arguing beyond an appeal to a gut feeling 
that one particular option is wrong. Ethics offers a vocabulary in which to 
voice a concern and challenge a decision that seems to be morally ques-
tionable. Psychology and criminology helps to understand how people of 
reasonably strong character and ability to reason about their choices can 
nevertheless become involved in serious wrongdoing.
The academic and practical contribution of this book is to combine two 
research streams to create a platform for responsible conduct in organiza-
tions. Training in ethical analysis, focus on moral character, and integra-
tion of codes of conduct are important to maintain normative standards 
in organizations, but even people with superior analytical skills who are 
strongly committed to an adequate set of moral values, and take guidance 
from a set of codes and principles can become entangled in moral wrong-
doing. Studies in moral psychology and criminology enlighten how this 
may happen, and provides input to how to avoid it. These reflections are 
relevant both for how to conduct systematic ethics initiatives in organiza-
tions, and for teaching of business and organizational ethics to students. It is 
not sufficient to make people familiar with ethical tools and principles, and 
to attempt to isolate individuals of strong moral character to become the 
leading decision-makers. Insights from psychological disciplines indicate 
that collective justification processes can pave the way for wrongdoing. The 
main countermeasure can be to make it acceptable and normal to criticize 
moral neutralization attempts openly. When that happens, ethics in organi-
zations move beyond compliance and fulfilment of external expectations, 
to the serious everyday conversations about right and wrong.
Note
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3849147.stm.1 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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2
Moral Dilemmas
Abstract: Moral dilemmas are situations where two or more 
moral values or duties make demands on the decision-maker, 
who can only honour one of them, and thus will violate at 
least one important moral concern, no matter what he or 
she decides to do. This chapter draws a distinction between 
real and false dilemmas. It defines the former as situations 
where there is tension between moral values and duties that 
are more or less on equal footing. The decision-maker has to 
choose between a wrong and another wrong. It defines the 
latter as situations where the decision-maker has a moral 
duty to do one thing, but is tempted or under pressure to do 
something else. A false dilemma is a choice between a right 
and a wrong.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0004.
OPEN
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Anne is the project manager of a large industrial project in a developing 
country, run by a Nordic company. On a crucial day for the project, the 
electricity is suddenly gone from the entire plant. Large quantities of 
cement are about to congeal in the blenders, and it is crucial to activate 
them again, quickly. More than a thousand employees are unable to do 
their work. Anne contacts the local authorities to solve the problem. A 
bureaucrat turns up at the plant and explains that he can get the electric-
ity back on again very quickly, on the condition that he can bring ten of 
the company’s PCs back to the town hall. There is a desperate shortage of 
PCs there, and the bureaucrat and his colleagues are therefore unable to 
do provide adequate service to the local community. Thus, he suggests a 
trade-off: PCs for electricity. In this manner, Anne and her company can 
make a significant contribution to the society in which they operate.
Time is of the essence, and Anne has little time to dwell on the 
alternatives. There is no time to contact top management in her home 
country to get advice or instructions about what to do. She has to figure 
this out by herself. If the cement congeals today, it will mean a consider-
able delay in the project. Several operations will have to be redone, at a 
high cost, particularly compared to cost of losing ten PCs that can be 
easily replaced. Anne also has sympathy with the local bureaucrats and 
the population they are serving. They will probably make very good use 
of the PCs. On the other hand, if she gives in to blackmail this time, the 
same may happen again, at other crucial stages of the project. Anne faces 
a difficult choice. What should she do?
Anne wants to honour the moral value of finishing the project on time 
and within budget, but also the moral value of not giving in to blackmail 
or corruption. One of these values will have to give way at the expense of 
the other. There is no harmonious way out, where Anne can say that she 
has done everything right.
Moral dilemmas are a pervasive part of working life. They occur in the 
public and private sectors and from the smallest to the largest organiza-
tions. Every decision-maker can encounter them, from the executive 
level and downwards. In hectic working environments, people can 
become blind to the moral dilemmas they face, by failing to see the moral 
dimensions of their choices. Understanding the nature of moral dilem-
mas is important within organizations, in order to identify and recognize 
them, and find ways in which to deal with them in a responsible manner. 
Kidder (2005, p. 89) has suggested that although there can be a myriad 
of moral dilemmas, they tend to fall into four patterns: Truth versus 
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loyalty, individual versus community, short term versus long term, and 
justice versus virtue. Categorizing moral dilemmas in this manner can 
be a useful way to identify and start to address them.
We can understand morality or morals as a set of personal and shared 
beliefs about right and wrong in the interaction between human beings 
(Goodpaster, 1992, p. 111; Buchholz and Rosenthal, 1998, p. 4). Over time, 
individuals and groups form moral convictions and beliefs about how 
one ought to behave towards others. The universe of beings we believe to 
have moral obligations towards may include other animals. The concepts 
of morals or morality on the one hand, and ethics on the other are in 
many contexts understood to be synonymous. From the outset, the 
concepts have had the same meaning. Morals have Latin roots and ethics 
stems from classical Greek, and both depicted respectable and good 
behaviour in a given society. Gradually the concepts have become labels 
for different phenomena. As noted above, morality can be defined as a 
set of beliefs and convictions about right and wrong in the interaction 
between human beings, and our obligations towards animals. Ethics, on 
the other hand, is the discipline of thinking systematically about right 
and wrong. We learn morality differently from how we learn ethics. 
Moral beliefs and convictions is something we adopt through social 
interaction, while ethics is an academic discipline that we can study 
and learn by reading books and attending seminars. We can take ethics 
courses and pass ethics exams. There are no equivalent activities on the 
morality side. The closest we come are the everyday or more extraordi-
nary moral tests and challenges where have to make choices and either 
live in accordance with our moral convictions or not.
Morality and ethics play different roles in decision-making. A person 
facing a challenging situation can have a moral intuition about what 
would be the right choice, based on personal moral convictions, more 
or less shared in the community or culture. He can also engage in ethical 
analysis in order to clarify the issues at stake. We can liken these two 
approaches to Kahneman’s distinction between fast and slow decision-
making processes (Kahneman, 2011). He describes how human decisions 
originate in either what he calls System 1 thinking, which is quick and 
impulsive, and System 2 thinking, which is slow and analytic. When a 
person faces a morally challenging situation, he or she can draw upon 
the resources of both systems. There may not be time for a full-scale 
analysis of the options at hand, and the person may have to rely on a 
gut feeling or moral impulse about what to do. Kahneman documents 
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how we are systematically prone to make mistakes when we rely solely 
on quick thinking and what the heart immediately tells us (Kahneman, 
2011). We can reap great benefits from activating the slow System 2 to 
weight the pro and cons of the alternatives. People who rely too heavily 
on analysis, however, can tend to be passive and immobile in situations 
that call for a rapid response. When we have thought things thoroughly 
through, it is too late to do anything.
We have system 1 and system 2 resources in place to think about and 
respond to moral dilemmas. On the one hand, we have moral intuitions 
and gut feelings about what we should do, based on our moral beliefs 
and convictions. On the other hand, we have the opportunity to engage 
in ethical analysis, identifying alternative courses of action and testing 
whether they can be properly justified.
A dilemma in the most general sense is a situation requiring a choice 
between two options that are or seem to be equally undesirable or 
unsatisfactory. There can be non-moral dilemmas, where the choice is 
between options that are undesirable or unsatisfactory for non-moral 
reasons. A person can have enough money to buy either a book or a 
shirt, and need both. Only one choice is possible, and the preference for 
one over the other will lead to some disappointment, in that it will fulfil 
only one of the two desires. There need not be any moral dimension to 
the undesirability of prioritizing the purchase of a book over a shirt, or 
the opposite choice.
A moral dilemma is a situation where the decision-maker has to give 
priority to one moral value over another (Toffler, 1986; Maclagan, 2003; 
Jackson, 1996; Brinkmann, 2005). They “arise when, faced with a difficult 
situation (e.g. fair treatment for some versus job security for others), two 
or more such values conflict in the perception of a decision maker, or 
when one is assessing another’s moral choice” ( Maclagan, 2003, p. 22). 
A person facing a dilemma must decide which moral duty to prioritize, 
and “whichever action is taken it will offend an important moral value” 
(ibid, p. 23).
In a moral dilemma, it is impossible to live up to all of one’s moral 
convictions and beliefs regarding how one should behave in that situ-
ation. Anne in the opening example is morally committed to keep the 
industrial project on track, but also to reject blackmail and bribery. In 
the situation she faces, one of these moral commitments will have to give 
way at the expense of the other. She may not have a clear system 1 intui-
tion about what to do, and even after some initial system 2 reflection, the 
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dilemma and the tension remains. Top management at home may still 
be unavailable, so she has to decide upon a response to the bureaucrat’s 
offer on her own.
A moral dilemma may occur because of a prior personal mistake. The 
predicament of the situation is self-inflicted. A classic example is the 
story from the Bible about King Herod. On his birthday, his stepdaughter 
Salome danced so well in front of him and the guests at his party that he 
promised to give her anything she wanted. Salome consulted her mother 
about what she should wish for, and decided to ask for the head of John the 
Baptist on a platter. The king now had a choice between honouring the 
promise to his stepdaughter, or honouring the life of John the Baptist. 
The king had inadvertently designed a moral trap for himself, a dilemma 
where whatever he decided to do would be morally wrong.
One contemporary and everyday instance of a self-inflicted moral 
dilemma can be a situation where you make a double booking in the 
calendar, and hand out individual promises to be somewhere at 2 o’clock 
to two different people. You cannot keep both promises, and must choose 
between the wrong of breaking one promise and the wrong of breaking 
the other promise. You may have good moral reasons to keep promise 1 
as well as promise 2, but must make a choice between them.
In a narrow sense, a moral dilemma is a situation where the moral 
values at stake are of equal importance. The appointments you have 
made for 2 o’clock may have equally strong pull and significance. Your 
moral reasons for keeping promise 1 are then exactly as strong as your 
moral reasons for keeping promise 2. There really is no choice available 
that is less wrong than the other choice. The situation is one where moral 
wrongdoing is inescapable (Gowans, 1994).
In a wider sense, there can be moral dilemmas where a person has 
strong moral reasons to do one thing, and notable but not equally strong 
moral reasons to do something else. When you consider the nature of 
the two promises, you may conclude that it is more urgent to meet one 
of them rather than the other. Something of moral value will be lost if 
you decide to keep the former promise and break the latter, but it is not 
really a hard moral choice, in the sense that anybody will have reasons 
to challenge or cast doubt about the rightness of your decision. You have 
a choice between a lesser wrong and a greater wrong. The other person 
you were supposed to meet will be disappointed and irritated by the 
cancellation, but is likely to understand the priority given to keeping the 
other promise.
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The Herod case is also one where there is an imbalance in the moral 
weight of the two options. Herod in his exuberance made a questionable 
promise to Salome, and she in turn took advantage of the situation to 
make a horrible request. It seems that the king has stronger moral reasons 
to spare the life of John the Baptist than he has to keep his word to his 
stepdaughter. Something of moral value and importance will regrettably 
have to give way, but the other option is or appears to be morally supe-
rior. We can still call the situation a moral dilemma, although not in the 
pure sense of representing a decision between moral values that are on 
equal footing.
False moral dilemmas are instances where it is clear what a person 
ought to do, but he or she is either tempted or pressured to do some-
thing else. In business ethics, the distinction between these types of situ-
ations has also been labelled as one between dilemmas and temptations 
(Kidder, 1995, p. 7; Brinkmann, 2005, p. 183). Later in the book I discuss 
professional ethics and how the handling of conflicts of interest are at the 
core of the professionals’ moral responsibilities towards clients, custom-
ers, patients, students, and other users of professional services. A lawyer 
or an accountant can face an opportunity to prioritize self-interest over 
the client’s interest. The knowledge gap between the professional and the 
client is such that the risk of detection for such a choice is minimal. The 
professional can claim that he or she is facing a moral dilemma when an 
opportunity arises to oversell or overcharge a client. In the vocabulary 
of this book, it is more appropriate to describe such a situation as a false 
dilemma. It may resemble a real dilemma in that the decision-maker 
must decide between two options that are both undesirable in some way. 
Cheating on the client feels wrong, and so does the choice of turning 
down a chance to earn some extra money. The former feeling has moral 
component to it that is lacking in the latter. Thus, conflict of interest situ-
ations are generally false moral dilemmas, with only superficial likeness 
to real ones.
In connection with the dichotomy between real and false dilemmas, 
we need to acknowledge that there can be a continuum between them, 
as suggested by Maclagan (2003). On one side of the spectrum, we have 
situations where there is perfect balance between the two moral values 
that are at stake. Two promises are equally important. In another situa-
tion, the option to be compassionate towards another person has equal 
moral weight to the alternative of being honest to him or her. On the 
other side of the spectrum are the situations where the choice is clearly 
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between a morally right and a morally wrong option, as when a profes-
sional can choose to give priority to self-interest over client interest. 
In other cases where self-interest is involved, the distinctions are not 
so clear-cut, since pursuing self-interest on a personal as well as on an 
organizational level can have some moral value. Protection of one’s own 
economic security has a moral dimension to it (Maitland, 2002, p. 5), 
and not standing up to defend one’s own interests can be seen as a form 
of servility (Hill, 1985). Concrete cases, then, belong somewhere on the 
spectrum between purely real and purely false dilemmas.
Anne has to decide whether to get the electricity back by giving in 
to blackmail from local bureaucrats, or stand firm and see the cement 
congeal. Where exactly does the situation belong on the scale between 
real and false dilemmas? That depends on the further details of the 
case. The analysis Anne has to make in preparation for a decision does 
not require a precise placing of the dilemma on the scale, but rather an 
acknowledgement of the general dilemma nature of the situation. Anne’s 
particular dilemma builds on a true story, where the outcome was that 
the project manager decided on a two-step response. First, she handed 
over the PCs and got the electricity back on to get the project on track 
again. The next day she invited senior bureaucrats from the town hall to 
a meeting, where she explained that the company wanted to contribute 
to the local community, but not in the haphazard way of the previous 
day. Instead, she proposed a systematic plan for how the company could 
help the town hall to modernize its PCs and other electronic equipment. 
With this initiative, she came on better and closer speaking terms with 
the local administration, and avoided further blackmail situations.
The following case can serve to highlight how challenging it can be to 
face a situation close to the false dilemma end of the spectrum: Ben is 
the manager of a small private banking unit within a large financial serv-
ices group. Results have slumped recently, mainly due to a bitter conflict 
between one employee and some of his colleagues. They complain that 
he is rude and difficult to cooperate with. Ben has attempted to mitigate, 
to no avail. National legislation prohibits the option of firing the quarrel-
some employee, at least in the short run. Key members of Ben’s unit have 
become very upset by the situation and have started to look for work 
elsewhere.
A recent turn of events is that the employee himself has applied for a 
job in a different part of the financial services group. Ben has agreed to 
serve as a reference person. He receives a phone call from the manager 
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of the unit currently contemplating to hire the employee. She is particu-
larly interested in the employee’s social skills. “Does he function well 
with his colleagues?” she asks. If Ben gives an honest answer, he is likely 
to be stuck with the employee for a long time. If he is vague about the 
employee’s social skills, he may get rid of a problem. He then runs the 
risk that his honesty will come up for questioning later. It also feels 
wrong to lie to another person in order to get rid of a problem at work. 
Lying in this case would be an attempt to transport one’s own problem 
over to someone else, instead of taking responsibility and deal with it in 
one’s own organization. How should Ben respond to the question about 
the employee’s social abilities?
Ben must choose between being honest about an employee’s anti-
social behaviour and telling the truth, an option that seems guaranteed 
to block the employee’s move to another organization. Like Anne, he 
acknowledges that whatever he decides to do, something will be wrong.
At first glance, it can appear to be an obvious example of a false 
dilemma. Ben can choose between honouring the moral value of being 
truthful to others, or giving priority to a selfish need to get rid of a human 
resource management problem. We can understand that it is tempting to 
withhold information and thereby help the difficult employee on his way 
to a new job, but doing so would violate the moral duty to be honest in 
business dealings. Ben might reason that the employee deserves another 
chance in a new work environment. If he can open a new page in his 
career, he might blossom and be better able to fulfil his personal and 
professional potential. That is all very well, but these considerations seem 
weak and constructed to camouflage a violation of a moral requirement 
to be straightforward and honest as a reference person.
The extent to which Ben’s situation is a real or a false dilemma will 
depend on the details of the case. I have used the case as a starting point 
both for ethical teaching of business managers and business school 
students, as well as for research in moral psychology, where the purpose 
has been to map the extent to which the situation creates moral disso-
nance and gets managers to engage in moral neutralization activities 
(Kvalnes, 2014). I return to that topic in Chapter 11. The participants in 
ethical training have conveyed their experiences from being on both 
sides of the table under circumstances where one party is strongly 
tempted to keep silent about the negative features of a person apply-
ing for a job. Some have been untruthful as reference-persons. Among 
those, some have lived to regret it because the choice has backfired. 
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When the employee ends up in the same kind of conflicts at the new 
workplace, it generates painful inquiries from the new employer about 
the honesty of the reference person. Others convey that they came away 
with one less burden on their shoulders. They have avoided further 
questions and inquiries about how and why they withheld information. I 
have also encountered managers who have been open and honest about 
the employee’s problems, and have found other means to deal with the 
conflict. American leaders have failed to grasp the tension of Ben’s situ-
ation. “What it the problem?” they say. “Why doesn’t Ben just fire the 
man with cooperation difficulties?” My work has for the most part taken 
place in Norway, where the legal scope for firing people in this manner 
is very limited.
The responses people have to Ben’s dilemma expose their moral beliefs 
and convictions. When I ask for justification of the choice of either being 
truthful or not, the participants at my ethics courses have come up 
with a wide variety of reasons, expressing their individual loyalties and 
preferences. The first response is often that one alternative or another 
feels right or wrong. Two people who disagree on what to do compare 
feelings, and reach the conclusion that they feel differently about the 
case. The conversation is on Kahneman’s system 1 level, where quick gut 
feelings and intuitions rule, and my task as a facilitator is to introduce 
the slower system 2 level of reflection and analysis. Ethical reasoning is 
the process of lowering the tempo in order to become aware of the moral 
issues at stake, and to progress from a state of mismatching feelings to 
one where the participants are able to recognize the ethical and moral 
foundations for their own choices.
Moral dilemmas are everywhere in organizational life. Situations 
on the entire scale from real and acute dilemmas all the way to false 
pseudo-dilemmas constitute challenges that the decision-makers should 
prepare for. The following chapters present analytic resources from moral 
philosophy and ethics, in the shape of principles and concepts that can 
serve as tools in the process of figuring out what one ought to do and 
how to justify one’s choices in moral dilemmas.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Duties and Outcomes
Abstract: The two main traditions in moral philosophy differ 
in their perspectives on the lengths we can go to in order to 
maximize the best possible outcome for the people affected 
by our decisions and actions. Utilitarianism maintains that 
the morally right option in every situation is the one that 
will create the best overall outcome for all concerned while 
duty ethics claims that there are important limitations to 
what we can do to others, even if the option generates the 
best overall outcome. It places particular value on respect 
and human dignity, offering individuals moral protection 
against treatment as mere means to maximize outcomes. 
The chapter uses the trolley problem, introduced by Philippa 
Foot, as a starting point for exploring the differences between 
utilitarianism and duty ethics in organizational settings. It 
explains how the Doctrine of Double Effect and the distinction 
between intended and foreseen consequences allows duty 
ethics to accept harmful outcomes in some cases.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0005.
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Consequentialism is the view that the morally right thing to do in a 
given situation is to create the best possible overall outcome for all 
concerned. The dominant version of this tradition in moral philosophy is 
utilitarianism, which measures consequences in terms of utility and the 
extent to which our choices generate pleasure, pain, or the realization of 
positive and negative preferences to the people affected by our decisions. 
Contemporary utilitarianism takes its lead from the classical texts of 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. A utilitarian decision-maker will 
attempt to maximize the sum of utility for all concerned, and act with 
the view of promoting the common good. In contrast, the duty ethics 
tradition developed from the works of Immanuel Kant claims that there 
are moral considerations more important than creating maximum utility 
for those we can affect through our conduct. It proposes that it is never 
morally right to treat someone as mere means to achieve something, 
even if that something is the common good and total sum of well-being 
of others. The difference between the two traditions is that utilitarianism 
gives priority to outcome (the good) over conduct (the right), while duty 
ethics places conduct (the right) ahead of outcome (the good).
If Ben in the reference dilemma seeks advice from utilitarianism and 
duty ethics respectively, he will get different answers. A utilitarian will 
inquire about the difficulties the employee is causing at the current job, 
and the likelihood that he will cause more or less trouble if he gets a 
job in the other organization. Perhaps the potential employer has a 
better HR-department and is better equipped to handle a quarrelsome 
employee. For a utilitarian, this would count in favour of Ben keeping 
information to himself, rather than sharing it. If, on the other hand, the 
other organization is vulnerable and badly staffed to deal with quar-
relsome behaviour, the utilitarian pendulum would swing towards the 
honest alternative. For duty ethics, these considerations of alternative 
outcomes are morally irrelevant. Ben should be honest in the reference 
situation, no matter what the consequences are, since he has a moral 
obligation not to lie. To be dishonest towards the person inquiring about 
the personal qualities of the employee would be disrespectful, in the 
sense that Ben would be using him as a mere means to get rid of a prob-
lem. Human dignity is at stake both for Ben and the person contacting 
him about the employee, and Ben owes it to both of them to be frank 
and forthright.
One significant source of tension between utilitarianism and duty 
ethics is their conflicting views on the moral protection of those affected 
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by our decisions and conduct. One criticism from duty ethics directed 
towards utilitarianism is that it offers inadequate moral protection 
to individuals. It does not give sufficient moral weight to respect and 
human dignity, by approving the use of men, women, and children as 
mere means to promote the common good. Immanuel Kant provided 
a categorical imperative for analysis and contemplation of conduct, a 
way of thinking about right and wrong that he considered to be binding 
for any rational and moral human being, irrespective of cultural back-
ground. He expressed this imperative in different ways. The humanity 
formulation of the imperative addresses the topic of moral protection:
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only. (Kant, 1998/1785, p. 429)
Kant does not claim that we should not use other people as means, and 
would accept that we pay someone to sweep our floor or bring a parcel 
to the other side of town. What he considers morally forbidden is to use 
someone solely as means to an end, where the ways we involve them put 
hindrances on their opportunities to live a meaningful life. A slave-owner 
uses the slaves as merely as means to an end. If Ben tells lies to get rid of 
the difficult employee, he is using the other person merely as means to 
achieve his own goal of creating a more harmonious workplace.
A utilitarian can argue that torture and other horrible acts under 
some circumstances are not only morally permissible, but also morally 
required, since they maximize utility. From a duty ethics perspective, 
conclusions like that expose the absurdity of the utilitarian outlook. 
The response from utilitarianism is to criticize duty ethics for providing 
too much moral protection to individuals, generating passivity in situ-
ations where lives can be saved, and societies protected. Utilitarianism 
embraces the concept of dirty hands, or the idea that it is sometimes 
morally acceptable to perform actions that in and of themselves are 
horrible, in the name of the greater good for all those affected.
Moral reasoning and justification in organizations can show traces of 
utilitarianism and duty ethics, even when the protagonists have limited 
knowledge of the two traditions. Ethical theories tend to capture differ-
ent kinds of moral intuitions and gut feelings about how one should 
act under given circumstances. We can explore the issue further in the 
light of a fictitious story developed on the basis of remarks from the 
British philosopher Philippa Foot (1967, pp. 8–9). It is the famous trolley 
problem:
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You are standing by the side of a track and see a runaway trolley coming 
towards you at great speed. The trolley brakes have clearly failed. Further 
down the slope you can see that five people are tied down to the track. The 
train is heading towards them, and it looks a certainty that the will be run over 
and killed. As it happens, you are placed next to a signal switch. You can send 
the runaway trolley down a side track by turning the switch. Unfortunately, 
one person is tied to the track in that direction. That person will be run over 
and killed if you turn the switch. Your choice is between turning the switch to 
save five lives and kill one, or doing nothing and letting the five people down 
the track be killed. All of the six people affected by your decision are innocent 
victims. They do not deserve to be in this horrible situation. None of them 
are friends, relatives or acquaintances of you. What should you do?
The trolley case can be seen as a real moral dilemma in that you face a 
choice of either letting five people get killed, or causing one person to 
get killed. You have a moral reason to save other people’s lives, but also 
a moral reason to respect the life of innocent people, in this case the 
poor victim who is tied to the side-track. One of these moral reasons will 
have to give way. It seems that you encounter a choice between doing 
something wrong and doing something else, which is also wrong.
Foot introduced the trolley problem in a paper where she discussed 
the moral dimensions of abortion. It has become one of the most eagerly 
discussed stories in moral philosophy, and has created an entire research 
tradition that goes under the heading of trolleyology (Edmonds, 2014). 
We can be skeptical of the practical dimension of the trolley problem, 
since it describes an artificial situation with few contact points to real life. 
However, the strength of such a clean cut example is that it is possible to 
isolate and discuss particular features of moral reasoning. We may not 
expect to encounter a trolley problem in real life, but the moral intui-
tions and reflections generated by it are nevertheless relevant for how we 
respond to less dramatic everyday situations.
When people are presented with the trolley problem, a majority answer 
that they would have used the switch to put the trolley onto the side-
track (Greene et al., 2009). The pattern is the same in my ethics classes 
for Master of Science students, where around five hundred students 
participate annually. Their moral intuitions or gut feelings point them 
in the direction of doing what it takes to save five lives. Respondents of 
a utilitarian persuasion claim that it is not a moral dilemma in its purest 
sense, but rather a situation where it is painful to do the right thing. The 
outcome of the situation will either be that five or one person dies. The 
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morally right thing to do from a utilitarian perspective is clearly to keep 
the number of deaths to a minimum. If you let the trolley pass and run 
over the five people down the track, you have done something wrong, 
in that you have failed to reduce the killings from five to one. According 
to this line of thinking, then, the choice is between right and wrong. A 
utilitarian can nevertheless acknowledge that the trolley problem is a 
moral dilemma in the wider sense, since something of moral value is lost 
by intervening and causing the death of one innocent person.
Duty ethics can also, to some extent accepts that you use the switch 
to save five lives. It does so by appeal to the Doctrine of Double Effect 
(DDE). This ethical doctrine allows a person to cause serious harm to 
somebody, on the condition that the outcome is not (1) intended by the 
agent, but only (2) a foreseen consequence. St Thomas Aquinas provided 
the first formulation of DDE in the 13th Century, and it has remained an 
integral part of Catholic ethics ever since. The doctrine can legitimize 
the use of lethal doses of painkilling medicine for dying patients, where it 
distinguishes between (1) the intention to alleviate pain and (2) the fore-
seen death of the patient. As long as the intention is to kill pain and not 
to kill the patient, the alternative can be acceptable, according to DDE. 
The doctrine can also justify instances of abortion where the mother’s 
life is under threat, and the intention is (1) to save the mother’s life and 
(2) an unfortunate, foreseen consequence is the death of the unborn 
child. Going back to the Trolley problem, DDE can provide moral 
approval to use the switch since (1) your intention is to save the five, 
and (2) the unfortunate the death of one is only something you foresee. 
The ethical logic here is that you are primarily responsible for what you 
intend, and not for the foreseen, and in this instance, unfortunate effects 
of your conduct.
In organizations, DDE can provide justification for seriously harming 
individuals and groups in the name of commercial progress or other 
business objectives. The leadership of a fishing company in Iceland can 
decide to close down the fishing plant in a small community, arguing that 
(1) the intention is to make the organization fit for future market chal-
lenges, and that (2) the negative effects on the local community in the 
form of unemployment is only a foreseen side-effect. For this and similar 
uses of DDE to work, it is a prerequisite that the good outcome in (1) 
cannot be reached in any other manner than the one also involving (2). 
The good effect of (1) must also be sufficiently good to compensate for the 
bad effect in (2). In the Icelandic case, the commercial restructuring of 
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the fishing company to meet future market demands must be sufficiently 
good to compensate for job-losses and depopulation of rural areas.
DDE draws what from a utilitarian perspective is an artificial line 
between intended outcomes and merely foreseen outcomes. The deci-
sion-makers moral obligation is to maximize utility for all concerned, 
and whether the consequences are intended or only foreseen side-effects 
is of no significance for a utilitarian.
Judith Jarvis Thomson introduced a second version of the trolley 
problem to put pressure on the utilitarian argumentation (Thomson, 
1985). In this version there is also a runaway trolley hurtling down the 
track, and five innocent people tied down and facing death if you do 
not intervene. You are watching the event from a footbridge crossing the 
track. In front of you stands a fat man. The only way in which you can 
save the five this time, is by pushing this man down on the track. He will 
die from the fall, and the weight of his heavy body will suffice to stop the 
trolley. It is not an alternative to sacrifice yourself and jump ahead of the 
trolley instead of the fat man, since you are simply not heavy enough. 
Should you push the fat man?
For the utilitarian the conclusion here is the same as in the first version 
of the trolley case, since the central equation is the same. It is a matter 
of simple calculation: One life versus five lives. You should push the fat 
man in front of the trolley even if you thereby kill him, since that alter-
native will save five lives. Most people who encounter the experimental 
circumstances of the second trolley case disagree with this conclusion. 
Experiments show that people tend to reject the option of pushing the 
fat man (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2009). 
To the utilitarian this is irrational, since the relevant conditions and 
calculations are the same. All we need to know is that we can influence 
whether one life or five lives continue.
The alternative account can gather input from duty ethics, and claim 
that there is a morally relevant difference between the two cases. In the 
latter case, you would be using the life of one person to save the five. The 
fat man is an integral part of your plan to save them, while in the former 
case, the one person on the side-track unfortunately happens to be there. 
If, by some miracle he had managed to untie himself and get off the track 
before the trolley arrived, you would welcome that turn of events. If the 
fat man runs away, it destroys your whole plan. Duty ethics offers moral 
protection to the fat man. He can hide behind the principle that it is 
morally forbidden to treat another person as mere means, even if the 
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overall outcome will be better that way. DDE does not come into play 
here, since by pushing the fat man you would be intending to harm him. 
His death would thus be more than the mere foreseen and unintended 
side-effect of your conduct. Utilitarianism has the frightening feature 
that everybody can be sacrificed in one way or another, if it serves the 
purpose of maximizing utility for all concerned.
Neither utilitarianism nor duty ethics would describe the trolley prob-
lem as a pure moral dilemma, in the strict sense of presenting choices 
between two moral reasons, duties or values that are on equal footing. 
Both traditions would agree that something of moral significance will 
have to give way when you either choose to prioritize five lives over one, 
or not. Utilitarianism is not immune to the moral cost of doing some-
thing horrible for the greater good. Duty ethics is not immune to the 
moral cost of letting people die as a result of honouring moral duties. As 
such, the situation is a real moral dilemma, but both the utilitarian and 
the duty ethical approaches would describe the cases as choices between 
right and wrong, and not between wrong and wrong. For a person with-
out a stake in any of the two traditions, the real moral dilemma involves 
a choice between a utilitarian and a duty ethics response to the problem. 
The decision-maker can sympathize with both ethical perspectives, but 
must decide which of them to prioritize.
To what extent are trolley problems 1 and 2 reminiscent of real life 
challenges? The British politician Gordon Brown was once confronted 
with the following scenario (Edmonds, 2014, pp. 10–11): You have 
received information about a tsunami and imminent flood wave, and 
can rush to alert people in one of two directions. You can go either to 
the hut where a family of five Thai people lives, or to the hut where one 
British citizen is staying. There is no time to alert people in both huts, 
and your intervention will save the lives of those people. Which hut 
do you run to? Unlike in the trolley cases, the decision maker does not 
have an option that will cause death, but must prioritize between one 
live and five lives. The politician rejected the ethical challenge outright, 
and said he would use modern technology in the form of a mobile 
phone to save the people in both huts. From a utilitarian perspec-
tive, the correct answer would be to save five lives rather than one, as 
dictated by the principle of maximizing utility and well-being among 
those affected by the decision. A duty ethics person would be free to 
follow any course of action, since none of the alternatives involve being 
disrespectful in order to save lives. In such neutral circumstances, it 
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seems likely that duty ethics is free to favour the option that generates 
the best outcome.
Moral dilemmas require a response and something of moral value will 
be lost, no matter what we decide to do. In this chapter, we have seen 
that utilitarianism instructs the decision-maker to maximize utility for 
all those affected by the choice, while duty ethics introduces significant 
restrictions to how we can reasonably affect other people through our 
actions. For the former, the end of making the world maximally good can 
justify the means of sacrificing the lives or well-being of some individu-
als. The latter provides moral protection for the individual, insisting that 
we never use others merely as means, no matter how great the overall 
benefit is. These alternative ethical perspectives can sometimes generate 
the same conclusions about what we should do, but will often collide and 
provide opposite normative advice.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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4
Moral Luck
Abstract: The concept of moral luck appears to be an 
oxymoron, since it indicates that the right- or wrongness of a 
particular action can depend on the agent’s good or bad luck. 
That goes against the assumption that the moral quality of 
our conduct, the praise- and blameworthiness of what we do, 
should only hinge on factors that are within our own control. 
It seems unreasonable to let the moral verdict of someone’s 
decision and action depend on whether the outcome happens 
to be good or bad, particularly in situations where luck plays 
a significant part in how things turn out. In organizational 
life, moral luck nevertheless is a recurring phenomenon, 
in that actual outcomes do affect our moral evaluations of 
what people do. A reckless person can get away with his or 
her moral gamble if the outcome is good, but will get severe 
criticism in the likely event of a bad outcome. This chapter 
explores how moral luck connects to the normative theories of 
duty ethics and utilitarianism, and the extent to which moral 
evaluations based on actual outcomes are acceptable.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0006.
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An entrepreneur needs backing from his investors to start a business 
venture in the far north of Norway. The venture will provide much 
needed activity in the local community, and create hundreds of jobs to 
people who have been unemployed for a long time. One key element 
in the story the entrepreneur has told his investors is that he will have 
a strategic relationship with a multinational customer from day one. 
The day before finalizing the investment, the customer announces that 
they are backing out. If the entrepreneur informs the investors about 
this negative development, they are likely to withdraw from the project. 
Should he nevertheless tell them now, or wait until the first board meet-
ing, after the money from the investors is in the bank?
The entrepreneur can turn to duty ethics and utilitarianism for guid-
ance in this situation. From a duty ethics perspective, to keep the inves-
tors out of the information loop is morally unacceptable. It does not help 
that the outcome is likely to generate work and be good for the local 
community. Duty ethics encourages the decision maker to consider how 
he would want anybody else in a similar position to behave. Would it be 
morally acceptable if all entrepreneurs withheld information from their 
financial partners in such situations? No, is the answer coming from 
duty ethics, since no rational person can will that deception becomes the 
standard way to act in such situations, without becoming inconsistent, 
making exceptions for him- or herself. Furthermore, the act of keeping 
crucial information from the investors would be an example of using 
them as mere means to achieve financial success and create jobs, and 
as such, it would be morally unacceptable from the perspective of the 
humanity formulation of the categorical imperative.
A utilitarian can see things differently, and will take into account that 
the project will create important jobs and activity in a poor community. 
Keeping the information away from the investors might be necessary in 
order to maximize utility for all concerned, and promote the common 
good. However, the case can illustrate a split amongst the utilitarians. 
Some of them share the duty ethical concerns about universality. What 
if everybody in business started to keep information away from their 
own investors and business partners? That would create environments of 
distrust, and cause bad outcomes in the long term. Other utilitarians are 
not concerned about this aspect of the situation, and focuses instead on 
the here and now. The split in the utilitarian ranks is real. One fraction 
is called rule utilitarianism, and it proposes a two-step decision-making 
process: First, identify the rule of action that will generate the most 
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utility and common good in situations like these, and then act in accord-
ance with that rule. They agree with duty ethics in the entrepreneur case, 
and advise him to be transparent and open with the investors, since that 
would be to follow the rule most likely to maximize utility in such situ-
ations. If every entrepreneur started to keep bad news from their inves-
tors, it is likely that it would have created mistrust in their relations, and 
the overall outcome would have been negative. The alternative theoreti-
cal fraction is called act utilitarianism, and it maintains that the simple 
principle to follow is to choose the available course of action that will 
maximize utility. The entrepreneur should keep the information about 
the customer withdrawal to himself, since openness would jeopardize 
the project to create jobs in the far north of Norway. This should not 
be mistaken for an egoistic argument, since it is out of concern for the 
common good and the inhabitants of the local community that it would 
be right for the entrepreneur to keep the information to himself.
The story about the entrepreneur and his investors continues. He 
decided not to share the information about the loss of the customer to 
his investors, and the project gets underway. New customers arrive quite 
early in the process, and the project becomes a success, creating profits 
for the investors and new jobs for local people. The business venture was 
the starting point for social development and growth in the community. 
Hundreds of people now have a good income and can remain with 
their families in their local community. At the ten-year anniversary of 
the project, the entrepreneur drew attention to the opening incident, 
when he was in serious doubt about telling his investors or not about 
the customer withdrawal. Now he can look back and be relieved that 
he did not follow the moral intuition to be open and transparent with 
the investors. To this day, he is convinced that they would have taken 
their money elsewhere if he had told them about the negative develop-
ment. The project would have collapsed, and there would have been no 
new jobs in the local community. He believes that the actual positive 
outcome justifies the decision to keep quiet. He thinks that the overall 
consequences in terms of benefits to the local community prove that he 
was right in doing so.
The extent to which we agree with the entrepreneur’s evaluation 
depend on our stance on what we can call moral luck. The philosophers 
Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981) introduced the concept 
of moral luck, with the intention of identifying a tension in our moral 
reasoning. On the one hand, we believe that morality is immune to luck, 
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in the sense that people are only morally responsible for aspects of their 
behaviour that have been within their control. It seems unreasonable 
to blame or praise someone for actions and outcomes that largely have 
come about through a set of fortunate or unfortunate circumstances. On 
the other hand, the actual outcomes of what people to tend to colour our 
evaluations of their conduct. Theoretically, we may be convinced about 
the moral irrelevance of luck, but in practice, we discriminate and judge 
based on actual outcomes.
One domestic example we can use to illustrate moral luck is that of 
drunk driving. Two guests who have drunk considerable amounts of 
alcohol at a party may both foolishly decide to drive home in their cars. 
They are equally to blame for exposing other people to the risk of seri-
ous harm and death. One drunk driver gets home safely without hurt-
ing anybody, while the other hits and kills a pedestrian while driving 
on a red light at a street crossing. The former is likely to get off more 
lightly than the latter, both legally and morally. From a legal perspec-
tive, it makes sense to distinguish between the two cases, but morally 
it seems that both deserve equal amounts of blame and criticism. Both 
have put other people at risk, in exactly the same manner. In general, we 
can be convinced that there is no morally relevant difference between 
the two cases, but in reality, it is commonplace to distinguish between 
them, and even shrug at the former driver’s behaviour. There seems to 
be an unsatisfactory imbalance, then, between our moral theory and our 
moral practice.
Michaelson (2008) has studied moral luck in a business context, using 
as his main example the pharmaceutical company Merck and their devel-
opment of medicine to cure river blindness, a plague affecting millions 
of poor people in river-dwelling communities in West Africa and Latin 
America. The company made the decision to invest in the development 
of the medicine under a cloud of uncertainty, not knowing if it would 
ever become profitable and of any help to the sufferers of the disease. 
The project has proved to be both profitable and effective in treating the 
disease. Since the program began in 1987, more than 40 million people 
annually, in 30 different countries, have benefitted from the medicine, 
and Merck have committed itself to manufacture and distribute it for 
as long as river blindness exists. The company and its executives have 
received praise and recognition for their efforts, although the outcome 
has depended upon factors well beyond their control. Due to good moral 
luck, the initial decision to invest and develop the medicine turned into a 
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success story of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. With 
a negative outcome, the responsible executives would most likely have 
received criticism for wasting the investors’ and the owners’ money to 
no avail.
The research literature acknowledges three categories of moral luck. 
The most prominent one is resultant moral luck, where the entrepreneur 
story from the north of Norway and Merck and the river blindness medi-
cine are examples. Then there is constitutive moral luck, which has to 
do with the elements affecting a person’s character. Nature and nurture, 
genetic heritage and culture, can affect the extent to which a person is 
respectful, honest, kind, and benevolent in his or her interactions with 
other people. Good or bad luck plays a significant part in the formative 
processes, yet we tend not to take it into account when praising or blam-
ing people for the character traits they have. The third category goes 
under the name of situational moral luck, and concerns the moral tests 
a person faces or avoids, and the extent to which character traits become 
publicly exposed. A person can be morally fortunate to never face situ-
ations where her moral weaknesses are exposed, or morally unfortunate 
to never get a chance to demonstrate personal courage and honesty, 
since the situations she faces do not call for the application these moral 
qualities.
There is room for a fourth category of moral luck, not yet identified 
or discussed in the studies of this phenomenon. We can call it relational 
moral luck, and it concerns the social environment a person finds him- 
or herself in at the time of decision-making. At crucial points in the 
process of judging and reasoning about what to do, the decision-maker 
depends on feedback from others, in the form of support or opposition 
to the ideas that are on the table. In an organization, he or she needs 
colleagues who intervene and question the assumptions that are present 
in the reasoning. I return to the concept of relational moral luck in the 
final chapter of the book, where I dwell more explicitly on the nature 
of the thought processes that lead from contemplation of options and 
alternatives, to action, and the extent to which their quality depends on 
the social side of decision-making.
To what extent does moral luck pose a challenge to the coherence of 
our moral reasoning? Nagel and Williams thought that they identified 
a deep tension in the way we think about right and wrong when they 
introduced the concept. Moral luck is no doubt a thought-provoking 
concept and can serve as a reminder that success and failure often 
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depends on factors beyond our own control. However, I do not think the 
philosophers who launched it actually managed to reveal any profound 
inconsistencies in our moral thinking. Rather, the examples of moral 
luck indicate that we sometimes mistakenly let actual outcomes affect 
our evaluations of character and conduct. These evaluations do not 
appear to survive careful analysis. The considered view we are likely to 
reach is that success does not justify lying to an investor, that the conduct 
of the two drunk drivers are equally morally wrong, and that we can 
judge the Merck initiative to cure river blindness independently of the 
actual outcome. Moral luck would have been much more troubling if 
there were tensions between what we take to be the correct evaluations 
of conduct, and the general assumptions we have about right and wrong. 
The main value of the concept is that it can serve as a reminder of how 
outcomes affect our moral judgements, and that we have good reasons to 
correct them when they do.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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5
Two Ethical Principles
Abstract: This chapter presents two ethical principles that 
are helpful in analyses of morally challenging situations at 
work. The principle of equality states that equal cases should 
be treated equally, and that a difference in treatment requires 
that we can identify a morally relevant difference. The 
principle is related to the Golden Rule, and to the consistency 
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. The principle of 
publicity states that the decision-maker should be willing to 
defend his or her decision face-to-face with relevant individuals 
and groups of people. In an organizational setting, this can 
include internal and external stakeholders like one’s colleagues, 
leaders, customers, and suppliers. This principle is related to 
the universality formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, in 
that it invites a consideration of whether other rational agents 
would endorse the decision or judgement. From the outset, the 
two principles are neutral with regard to the tension between 
utilitarianism and duty ethics. Both traditions can acknowledge 
that different treatment requires the identification of a morally 
relevant difference, but will disagree about what constitutes 
such a difference. They can also acknowledge the transparency 
requirement inherent in the principle of publicity, but again 
part company when it comes to the applications of the principle.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0007.
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Clare is a professor at a business school. She recently bid farewell to a 
very talented MBA-student that she has supervised to an A degree. On 
the final day of term before Christmas, the student turned up at her 
office with a flat package wrapped in gift paper. He wanted to thank her 
for the excellent work she had done in supporting and supervising him 
during his studies. He was now heading back to his home country in the 
Middle East. From the size and shape of the package, Clare assumed that 
it contained chocolate, and had no hesitation in accepting it. Two weeks 
later, she has friends over for a Christmas party, and wants to share the 
chocolate with them. She unwraps the package and finds that what is 
beneath the gift paper is an iPad. What she had assumed to be a cheap 
and innocent chocolate gift was instead an expensive electronic device. 
She is devastated. What should she do now? Can she keep the iPad?
Clare’s initial moral intuition is that the answer is no. She needs to 
locate the student and return the iPad. This gift is too valuable to hold 
onto. Then she slows down and starts to engage in ethical analysis. She 
can consult utilitarianism and duty ethics, but their doctrines seem 
designed for grander situations, where more is at stake. To maximize 
utility with or without treating others as mere means is not the core issue 
in the situation Clare faces. What she needs is a set of simpler ethical 
principles. One place to start is with the formal principle of equality, an 
inheritance from Aristotle:
Equal cases should be treated equally. A difference in treatment requires that 
there is a morally relevant difference between the two cases.
When the student turned up at Clare’s office, she did not hesitate to 
accept the gift he handed her, since she assumed it was chocolate. Now 
the situation is different, but how might it be different in a morally 
relevant sense? The striking difference between a box of chocolate and an 
iPad is in the monetary value. Clare assumes that the former costs about 
30 Euro, and the latter about 500 Euro. Had she known at the time that 
the package contained an iPad, she would have turned it down, since she 
considers the value to be too high in relation to the work she has done 
for the student. A box of chocolate can be seen as a simple and symbolic 
gesture of gratitude, and Clare struggles to see the iPad in that light, due 
to the high price. Cost, then, appears to be a morally relevant feature, but 
is the difference between the assumed and the real price great enough to 
warrant either a process to locate the student and return the iPad, or to 
find another way to dispose of it?
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Clare faces a situation where she would be grateful for a concise demar-
cation between a gift and a bribe. Many transactions in organizational 
life occur in the grey zone between the white and innocent practice of 
exchanging gifts, and the grim blackness of pure bribery. Equipped with 
the principle of equality we can enter this grey zone with the intention 
of deciding where to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
transactions. Five aspects seem particularly relevant:
A. Intention: What does the giver want to achieve?
B. Roles: What are the particular roles and positions of the giver and 
receiver?
C. Timing: When does the transaction take place? Before or after a 
decision?
D. Value: What is the value of the object changing hands?
E.  Culture: Is it customary in this culture to offer gifts of this kind?
Clare can apply this list to her own situation, to clear her own mind for a 
decision on the matter:
A. Bribes are normally offered in order to gain an improper 
advantage. Clare is convinced that the student’s intention was to 
show gratitude, and not to affect future decisions on her part. It is 
unlikely that she will ever see or hear from him again.
B. Clare has been a supervisor to the student, and so has been in 
a higher ranking position than the giver. She has had power to 
affect the outcome of the grading, but that period ended when the 
student got the A grade, before she received the package.
C. Bribery occurs before a decision takes place, not after, unless the 
participants have agreed beforehand that a transaction will happen 
after the desired and agreed upon decision has been made. This 
does not hold in Clare’s case, since the package came as a genuine 
surprise, on the right side of the timeline. She would not have 
accepted it if the student had offered it to her before the grading, 
even if she had thought that it only contained chocolate.
D. The value of an iPad is high, and a decision-maker would normally 
have to reject it, since one could reasonably think that the reception 
of such an object would have the power to affect a decision, on a 
conscious or subconscious level. The receiver will normally feel 
that he or she owes the giver a considerable favour. An iPad creates 
indebtedness, but Clare can argue that she will probably never be in 
a position to repay the debt, and so should be free to accept it.
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E. The student comes from an area of the world where generous and 
valuable tokens of gratitude are accepted and expected. Turning 
them down can be interpreted as rude and impolite. On the other 
hand, such generous gifts are not part of the academic culture 
where Clare works, and it is not obvious which cultural norms 
should have the upper hand in the situation.
In sum, the analysis generated by the use of the principle of equality 
appears to support the conclusion that Clare can keep the iPad and 
consider it a pure and genuine gift rather than a calculated bribe. There 
may still be other arguments in favour of returning or giving up the iPad, 
but so far the reflections based on equality considerations give Clare 
moral reasons to hold on to it.
Another analytic test that flows from the principle of equality is one 
where the decision-maker can consider whether he or she would accept 
that his or her conduct became the norm for how to deal with situations 
of the same kind. Equal cases should be treated equally. If Clare thinks it 
is morally acceptable for her to keep the iPad, then presumably she must 
also believe that it morally acceptable for anybody else to do the same, 
under the same kind of circumstances. The fact that it is Clare and not 
Clarissa that faces this situation is normally not a relevant difference.
The principle of equality is similar to the Golden Rule, or the princi-
ple that one should treat others the way one would want them to treat 
oneself. An early version is attributed to the Greek philosopher Thales: 
“Avoid doing what you would blame others for doing.” The Golden Rule 
appears in many religions, philosophies, and cultures. It accentuates the 
idea that whether it is you or somebody else facing a particular deci-
sion situation, is from the outset morally irrelevant. It therefore follows 
that you should behave towards others in ways that you would want and 
accept that others to behave towards you.
Immanuel Kant’s consistency formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative appears similar to the Golden Rule, and is often interpreted 
as a version of it:
Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law. (Kant, 1998/1785, p. 422)
Kant thought that the Golden Rule lacked the universal and formal 
dimensions he sought to articulate in the Categorical Imperative. 
The Golden Rule is more of a hypothetical imperative, on his view. It 
encourages thinking of the kind that if you want people to be helpful 
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towards yourself, then you should be helpful towards them. Presumably, 
if helpfulness is not something you particularly treasure in others, you 
have no moral obligation to be helpful towards others. Kant meant the 
categorical imperative to be stricter than a hypothetical one in that it is 
universally binding for all rational beings, and not contingent upon indi-
vidual or cultural differences. It seems that he considered the Categorical 
Imperative to be an improvement on the Golden Rule in the sense that 
it avoided subjectivity and added universality as a requirement of moral 
considerations.
The principle of equality puts demands on the justification of choices. 
It requires that a decision-maker can back up a difference in treatment of 
two cases with an identification of a morally relevant difference between 
them, but does not single out one particular moral outlook or ethical 
foundation to be uniquely right. It does not favour duty ethics over 
utilitarianism, or vice versa, but remains neutral regarding the tension 
between them. As we saw in the discussion of the trolley problem, duty 
ethics considers the fact that a person is used as mere means to indicate 
that it is a morally unacceptable option, even though this option maxi-
mizes utility. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, considers consequences 
as the only morally relevant features of the situation, and thus comes to 
different conclusions about what to do. Both traditions acknowledge the 
principle of equality, but part company on the issue of what constitutes a 
morally relevant difference.
Looking back on previous examples from this book through the lens 
of the principle of equality, we can see how the justifications can take 
the form of finding reasons to make exceptions in the application of 
ordinary moral norms. In the blackmail case, Anne can claim that she 
does not give in to blackmail or other kinds of pressure that can occur 
in a corrupt economy, but that she makes an exception in this case, due 
to the colossal economic stakes that are involved. In the reference case, 
Ben can argue that he normally is truthful towards others, but that he is 
making an exception in this case, since he needs to restore harmony in 
his unit, and can do so effectively by hiding truths about the employee’s 
quarrelsome behaviour. In the second trolley case, a person can argue 
that he or she would normally not kill an innocent person, but that the 
current situation warrants an exception, since it is thereby possible to 
save five lives. Whether we accept these appeals to morally relevant 
differences depends on how well they fit with our moral convictions and 
beliefs.
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Turning back to Clare and her decision regarding the iPad, she also 
has access to a second ethical principle, one we can call the principle of 
publicity. Formulated to fit an organization setting, we can express it as 
follows:
You should be willing to defend your decision publicly, and be open about it 
to relevant people, that is to your leaders, colleagues, customers, suppliers, 
other business relations, and other relevant stakeholders.
At the core of this principle is an appeal to transparency. Decisions 
should withstand the light of day. By sharing the decision and talking 
openly and publicly about it, the decision-maker is seeking some sort 
of endorsement from his or her peers, and from rational stakeholders. 
In Clare’s case, the relevant people would primarily be her academic 
colleagues and students. The responses from the latter group is particu-
larly interesting. How would they respond to the information that profes-
sor Clare received and accepted an iPad from a student she supervised 
to an A? Accountants are a profession drilled in the use of a distinction 
that is relevant here. They learn to consider both how things are “in 
reality” and “in appearance”. A client may actually have been in good 
faith when underreporting about an incident, but it might appear to the 
authorities that he has intentionally misled them. Both what we take to 
be the truth and how it may appear to others is relevant. In line with 
this way of thinking, Clare can be totally convinced that there is no link 
whatsoever between the good grade and the iPad, and can also have no 
doubts that the student’s intention was to show gratitude. Nevertheless, 
she also should consider how other people are likely to view the situa-
tion. If students start to connect the iPad and the A, it can create doubts 
about her integrity as a supervisor.
The principle of publicity addresses whether a decision will stand up 
to public scrutiny. The principle is a part of many versions in ethical 
guidelines in the professions, and in organizations’ codes of conduct. 
It is sometimes called the New York Times test: Never do anything you 
would not want to see reported on the front page of the New York Times, 
or whichever newspaper you consider important. One American lawyer 
I have worked with calls it “the smell test”: Does this particular action 
smell all right, or is there an unpleasant odour to it? I have heard an 
accountant refer to it as “the Aunt test”. His rule of thumb is to ask 
himself whether his aunt, a person he perceives to have formidable integ-
rity and wisdom, would have found his choice morally acceptable. One 
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of my colleagues operates with a “blush test” and considers whether the 
course of action he is contemplating would make him blush if it became 
common knowledge.
One objection to the principle of publicity is that in business and 
elsewhere in society decision-makers may face situations where 
all the alternatives open to them have negative consequences. Real 
moral dilemmas have no painless solutions, and some people will 
have legitimate reasons to complain, no matter what the decision has 
been. Hooker (2010) gives the example of a CEO of a large corporation 
who decides that the most responsible option in the tough economic 
situation is to lay off several thousand employees. The individual 
consequences are severe, and the CEO would not like to see the stories 
enfold on the front pages of newspapers and websites. Nevertheless, 
what he did might be the most morally sound option available to him 
under the circumstances.
This objection is primarily relevant in relation to a version of the 
principle of publicity interpreted as a newspaper or media test. It may 
be painful for the CEO to experience detailed media exposure of the 
personal sufferings of the people he has laid off. That in itself is not 
enough to say that his conduct demonstrates a failure to act in accord-
ance with the principle of publicity. It is likely that relevant stakeholders 
will understand his predicament and acknowledge the fact that no pain-
less and harmonious options were acceptable to him.
A second objection to the principle of publicity is that it conflicts with 
the idea of having company secrets, in the form of strategies and plans 
the competitors should not know about. This objection stems from a 
misunderstanding of the principle. It is not a plea for you to spread your 
company secrets with the wind. It allows you to keep sensitive business 
information to yourself, but challenges you to consider how your deci-
sions would look to the public eye. X out the names of the companies 
and persons involved, and contemplate what kind of response you 
would get from people close to you if you chose this or that option in a 
dilemma.
The principle of publicity invites reflection on the extent to which other 
rational agents would endorse our judgements and decisions. As such, it 
resembles the universality formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative:
Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a 
universal law of nature. (Kant, 1998, p. 422)
10.1057/9781137532619 - Moral Reasoning at Work, Øyvind Kvalnes
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ed
 fr
o
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 n
pg
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
v
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
15
-1
1-
02
39Two Ethical Principles
DOI: 10.1057/9781137532619.0007
We can interpret this formulation to address the issue of transparency, 
and the extent to which your decision stands up to public scrutiny from 
other rational agents.
To sum up the practical contributions from normative ethics, utili-
tarianism offers one ethical principle, claiming that the decision-maker 
should strive to maximize utility for all concerned, and thus promote the 
common good. Duty ethics claims that there are limitations to what we 
should do in the name of promoting the common good, since we have 
a moral responsibility to respect other people and their human dignity. 
This ethical outlook comes to expression in the consistency, humanity, 
and universality formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. On a 
formal level, a utilitarian can actually accept the consistency and univer-
sality formulation, and say that he or she is consistently committed to 
the idea that one should maximize utility, even in a situation where that 
person would have to be sacrificed for the common good. The humanity 
formulation, however, is unacceptable to the utilitarian, and marks the 
point where the two ethical traditions are in fundamental disagreement.
The two ethical principles presented in this chapter offer a way to 
structure practical moral reasoning that oversteps the conflict between 
utilitarianism and duty ethics. We can apply the principles of equality 
and publicity to concrete cases without evoking the traditional tensions 
in ethical theory. That makes it possible to engage in ethical analysis of 
moral dilemmas without prior commitment to either of the two ethical 
theories.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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The Navigation Wheel
Abstract: When people encounter moral dilemmas at work 
and have to decide on a course of action, they can respond 
intuitively or analytically. From the analytic toolbox, they 
can pick up utilitarian and duty ethics considerations, and 
the principles of equality and publicity. This chapter adds 
content to the toolbox by introducing the Navigation Wheel, 
a figure designed to put ethical considerations into a context 
where the dimensions of law, identity, morality, reputation, 
and economy also matter. The Navigation Wheel can assist 
the decision-maker in keeping track of these six dimensions of 
the available alternatives. The priority of these dimensions are 
open to discussion in each separate case.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0008.
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Moral dilemmas call for a careful consideration of options before a decision 
takes place. Ethics offer analytic tools to engage in a systematic analysis of 
the alternative courses of action. We have seen that the two main tradi-
tions of ethics emphasize different and conflicting aspects of the situation 
in which the decision is taking place. Duty ethics focuses on respect and 
human dignity, while utilitarianism instructs the decision-maker to maxi-
mize utility and promote the common good, even at the expense of using 
other people merely as means to do so. We have also seen that the principles 
of equality and publicity provide guidance for evaluation of the alterna-
tives. Application can take place from a duty ethics perspective, and from 
a utilitarian one, but also from a perspective that is more or less neutral 
with regard to the tension between those theories. The decision-maker can 
consider whether there is a morally relevant difference between option A 
and option B, without being committed to a particular ethical theory.
This chapter adds to the decision-makers toolbox by introducing the 
Navigation Wheel, a figure designed by Einar Øverenget and myself 
(Kvalnes and Øverenget, 2012) to be the central component in ethics 
training in organizations. We have applied the Navigation Wheel in 
ethics seminars and courses in a range of different organizations, in the 
private and the public sectors, and in organizations of different shapes 
and sizes. The formative idea has been to supply the participants with a 
simple tool to use in practical settings where they face moral dilemmas 
and other challenging decision-situations:
What do
you do?
ECONOMY
ETHICS
Is it legal?
Does it aect our goodwill?
Can it be justied?
Is it in accordance
with business objectives?
Is it in accordance
with our values?
Is it right?
REPUTATION
LAW
MORALITY
IDENTITY
figure 6.1 The Navigation Wheel
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The set of questions presented in the Navigation Wheel belongs to a 
family of such analytic sets, from the simple ones such as Blanchard and 
Peale’s (1988): “Is it legal, is it fair, can I defend it?”, or Rion’s (1990) “Why 
is this bothering me? – Who else matters? – Is it my problem? – What 
is the ethical concern? – What do others think? – Am I being true to 
myself?” More complex approaches are described in van Luijk’s eight-
question list (1994), the eight-step list of Laczniak and Murphy (1985), 
the 12-step list of Nash (1989), and the 10-step list from the Markkula-
center (2007).
The decision-maker can address the questions in the Navigation 
Wheel to each alternative, in no particular order. It is also an open issue 
how to weight and prioritize them. Should ethical considerations trump 
economical ones, or vice versa? Is morality and doing the right thing 
more important than reputation? What should one do if the choice is 
between going economically bankrupt or compromise one’s values and 
go bankrupt with regard to identity? The Navigation Wheel does not 
build on a particular theory of how to settle such issues. The presenta-
tion I give of the six questions below does not indicate, then, that the 
decision-maker should give them a particular ranking or address them 
in a particular order.
LAW: Is it legal? This question can involve national as well as interna-
tional law. If the answer to this question is “no”, then any professional 
person has a strong reason to refrain from performing this action. The 
laws of a given society may not be perfectly matched with the decision-
makers personal morality, and even be at odds with the more or less 
common morality of ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, an employee in an 
organization is bound by those laws and owes it to his or her employer to 
stay within the realm of the legal options.
Civil disobedience is normally something that a person can choose to 
perform as an individual, not as the employee of an organization. There 
can nevertheless be cases were we have sympathy with someone who 
decides to break the law at work. Consider the following case, where the 
leader of a nursing home faces a dilemma: On a hot summer’s day, she 
receives an offer of fresh mackerel from a local fisherman. She sees this 
as a chance to arrange a grill party for the residents, where she can serve 
them excellent local fish, straight from the sea. However, the law on the 
matter is clear. The residents at the nursing home should only receive 
food from registered food suppliers. Legal mackerel is controlled, proc-
essed, and packaged the standard way, and arrive at the residents’ plates 
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as grey and harmless matter. In this situation, the nursing home leader 
can decide to take a chance and break the law, since she is convinced that 
the illegal fish will contribute to a far better culinary experience for the 
residents than the legal alternative. Her staff can check the fish for bone 
and harmful materials, and make sure that it will be safe to serve it. It is 
nevertheless a risk to take. We can see it as an example of good moral 
luck if there are no negative incidents at the table during the grill party.
One interesting and important asymmetry with regard to the legal 
aspect is that the illegality of an action provides a reason to refrain, 
while the legality does not provide a corresponding reason to act in that 
particular way. There are plenty of legal actions open to a person, that 
it for other reasons would be unwise to perform. You cannot respond 
convincingly to the question “How could you do such a thing?” the 
claim “Because it was legal”. Decision-makers should be aware of this 
asymmetry of the legal, but many fail to do so. Consider a situation 
where a communication advisor participates in a public debate about 
her country’s dominant diary producer, who had come under criti-
cism for trying to squeeze smaller competitors out of the market. She 
argues that the company has done nothing wrong, and protests intensely 
against talk of boycotting its products in support of the smaller diary 
product companies. “I love this company”, she declares in a television 
debate. What she fails to mention in the debate is that the company she 
defends also is a customer of her communication bureau. She appears 
to be a concerned citizen participating in a public debate on her own 
behalf, but is actually promoting the views of her own customer. When 
challenged on this issue, she can defend herself by saying that what she 
has done is legal. There is no law against hiding your professional ties 
to an organization in a public debate. With a response of this kind, she 
fails to understand that her critics are not questioning the legality of her 
participation, but rather its wisdom. More precisely, they raise doubts 
about the ethical dimension of her initiative in the debate.
We can also revisit Ben and the reference dilemma in order to illus-
trate the use of the Navigation Wheel. According to Norwegian national 
law, it is illegal to wilfully mislead a prospective new employer and 
lie about a person’s social competence in such a situation. You are not 
legally required to tell everything you consider relevant, but you risk 
prosecution for lying. Some of the participants in our courses have said 
that they always give honest answers when they are reference persons, 
but that they leave it to the questioner to identify the significant issues. 
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If an employee is somewhat lacking in social skills, and the questioner 
only inquire about technical skills, then that is his responsibility. You are 
not legally required to bring attention to issues that the questioner has 
overlooked or seems to consider irrelevant.
IDENTITY: Is it in accordance with our values? There can be two aspects 
of the question of identity. I have had ethics sessions with people who 
are part of particular professions, with their own strong identities. 
Accountants worldwide identify with the values of integrity and objec-
tivity, while practitioners in health institutions have a long tradition for 
caring and placing the patient’s interest in the forefront. A parallel identity 
issue concerns the organization’s own identity. Since Collins and Porras 
(1996) documented the significance of core values for stable commercial 
flourishing, there has been a growing interest in the maintenance of 
identity. Companies like Sony, Disney, Volvo, and Nike have succeeded in 
staying loyal to their own core values, and thus managed to establish an 
easily recognizable identity that they have benefitted from commercially.
How does the identity question affect the circumstances of a business 
manager Ben, who is the reference-person for an employee he would 
like to get rid of? I have presented the dilemma in one financial services 
organization where one of the core values is “team spirit”. The partici-
pants found that the concept strongly discourages the alternative of 
being dishonest to a questioner from the same organization. What then 
about the circumstances where the employee has applied for a job with 
a competitor? It seems that a situation where he moves on will enhance 
team spirit. Taken in isolation, then, this value seems to favour being 
economical with the truth.
Values in the sense described here are not identical to moral values. 
“Team spirit” can belong to the characteristics of an organization, and 
come into conflict with moral concerns. It can thus become an issue for 
consideration whether identity should trump morality, or vice versa. 
Something may have to give, and it can be a business manager’s respon-
sibility to decide which.
MORALITY: Is it right? When considering the moral aspect of a situ-
ation, a person’s convictions and beliefs about right and wrong set the 
framework. They can, to a greater or lesser extent be common beliefs 
shared with other people who have grown up in a similar culture, under 
similar circumstances, and they affect the moral intuition or gut feeling 
the person has with regard with what should and should not be done in 
the concrete situation.
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Is it morally acceptable for a reference person to lie about a person’s 
part in conflicts at work? Could we define it as a white lie? Most of the 
participants in the ethical training sessions I facilitate conclude that the 
answer is no. From the point of view of morality, they argue, the lying 
option is clearly unacceptable. Honesty is a central tenet in society as we 
know it, making it is disrespectful to tell lies. As indicated above, some 
claim that they will not tell a lie, but refrain from bringing attention to 
dark issues not addressed by the questioner. In arguing that way, they 
rely on a distinction between what is active and what is passive, favoured 
by thinkers in the tradition of duty ethics. They are bringing their moral 
convictions and commitments in touch with ethical theory. From this 
perspective, you are mainly accountable for the things you actively do 
and not so much for what you refrain from doing. A utilitarian will chal-
lenge this stance, and claim that the active – passive distinction is morally 
irrelevant. Consequences count, whether they come about through acts 
of commission or omission. The outcome of Ben’s reluctance to convey 
relevant information about the employee can be that he receives a job 
offer on false premises. Ben could have stopped it, and he is morally 
accountable for his decision to keep quiet, according to the utilitarian.
The morality part of the Navigation Wheel is primarily a place to test 
moral intuitions about the case at hand, and not to engage in ethical 
analysis, but as the example illustrates, once we articulate a moral stand-
point or hear about other people’s gut feelings regarding a particular case, 
it is easy to become engaged in argumentation using ethical concepts.
REPUTATION: Does it affect our goodwill? One of the main conclusions 
I draw after many years of conducting ethics training with business 
people is that they are deeply and supremely concerned about their 
reputation. They consider it a necessary asset in order to reach strategic 
and economical goals. It takes years to build good reputation, but it can 
be lost very quickly, is a commonly held view in business communities.
Business leaders will protect their reputation even if that demands 
admitting to wrongdoing in cases where they have in fact acted 
responsibly and wisely. When the oil company Shell made plans to 
dispose of the redundant oil storage facility Brent Spar, they consulted 
environment specialists. The advice they got was that the safest option, 
both from an environmental and from an industrial health and secu-
rity perspective, was to dispose of the construction in deep Atlantic 
waters. British authorities accepted the plan as the Best Practicable 
Environmental Option (Zyglidopoulos, 2002, pp. 141–143). The activist 
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group Greenpeace protested, and started a campaign leading to wide-
spread boycott of Shell service stations in European countries. In the 
end, Shell decided to abandon the plan, in order to save reputation and 
avoid economic disruption. The company claimed that they needed to 
identify a better storage plan, although their own studies showed that 
deep-sea disposal outside Scotland was optimal from an environmental 
perspective. Later, Greenpeace had to acknowledge that the organization 
had grossly overestimated the environmental damage of the proposed 
disposal of Brent Spar. By that time, however, they had won the fight 
with Shell, and the media was only mildly interested in Greenpeace’s use 
of false numbers (Shell International, 2008). Bowie and Dunfee (2002) 
have questioned the wisdom of giving in to pressure in order to save 
reputation in such cases.
In ethical training, my general approach is that each person and 
each working environment must decide how to rank the questions in 
the Navigation Wheel. However, I do point to some disadvantages of 
giving top priority to reputation. For one, succumbing to media pres-
sure can have a negative effect on internal morale. Insurance companies 
sometimes give in to such pressure and hand out money to customers 
who are not entitled to it. They choose this option rather than attempt 
to correct what they see as the distorted picture painted in the press. For 
the companies’ employees such capitulation can be a bitter blow to their 
motivation.
This is not to deny that reputation matters. Ben has good reasons 
to be concerned with the effect on his reputation in the aftermath of 
his efforts as a reference-person. However, such considerations often 
take the attention away from the identity and morality dimensions of 
the options, and instead focus on appearance. I once encountered a 
company whose identity and values statement on their webpage said: 
“We want to be perceived as an honest company”. The focus, then, was 
not on actually being honest, but on maintaining an image of being 
an organization with that quality. The language of reputation had 
taken over from, or been confused with, the language of values. If the 
claim accurately expresses the dominant attitude in the company, we 
can expect that the motivation for honesty is shallow and frail. It only 
emerges when there is a chance of scoring reputation points, and not 
when public attention is absent.
Reputation can of course be a genuine and legitimate concern for the 
decision-maker. As noted in the discussion of the case where Professor 
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Clare faces the option of keeping an iPad given to her by a student, other 
people’s perceptions can be crucial. The professor can be convinced that 
the student gave her the iPad to express gratitude, and not to cash in 
any improper advantage later. She would be wise, however, to take into 
account not only what she takes to be the reality of the case, but also how 
it may reasonably appear to relevant others. Her reputation amongst 
students may suffer significantly if the iPad story reaches them, and this 
gives her a good reason not to keep it.
ECONOMY: Is it in accordance with business objectives? The inclusion on 
economy as one of the dimensions to take into consideration in ethi-
cal analysis raises eyebrows. Why is the question concerning business 
objectives addressed at all, when the topic of the day is moral dilem-
mas? It seems that economy and ethics belong to different spheres, and 
that profitability is not an issue to bring up in the ethical training in 
organizations.
Many of the most significant moral dilemmas do involve the balanc-
ing of economic considerations with other dimensions of the situation. 
As noted earlier, the choice under a given set of circumstances can be 
between going economically bankrupt or bankrupt with regard to 
identity. There may be legal and profitable options available, which are 
at odds with the basic values a company traditionally has stood for. By 
choosing such an option, the company in a significant sense ceases to 
be the unit it has been. It may keep its name and address, but the break 
with one or more core values means that the identity is different now. A 
transformation has taken place.
With regard to Ben and his options in the reference dilemma, he can 
have short term as well as long term economical concerns. In the short 
term, results may improve if he keeps his lips tight about the employee’s 
involvement in social conflicts. The working environment will probably 
respond with relief, and gain new energy with the removal of the cause 
of so much frustration. In the long term, however, this risky enterprise 
may backfire on the unit as a whole, and disrupt its ability to perform 
profitably. The economic dimension of a moral dilemma, then, warrants 
a consideration of short term and long terms benefits.
ETHICS: Can it be justified? This question invites a consideration of the 
alternatives in the light of ethical theories and principles from earlier 
chapters. The decision maker can compare and analyse the available 
options from a utilitarian or a duty ethics perspective, and by applying 
the principle of equality and the principle of publicity.
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In the discussion and analysis of a particular dilemma, the focus can 
be on all six of the dimensions addressed in the Navigation Wheel, or it 
can be on the tension between the answers we receive to two or more of 
the questions. The decision-maker can face a choice of giving primacy of 
economy (here we have a potentially profitable business option) or iden-
tity (it is not really us to act that way). The dilemma can be to prioritize 
between ethics (according to the principle of equality we can do this) 
and reputation (it may nevertheless harm our public image), or between 
law (it is illegal) and morality (I believe it is the right thing to do), and 
so on.
The main purpose of the Navigation Wheel is to assist the decision-
maker in his or her efforts to analyse the available options and keep track 
of the relevant dimensions of the situation. Is a person who has partici-
pated in ethics training and become familiar with the Navigation Wheel 
better equipped to deal with moral dilemmas and work, and less likely 
to engage in serious moral wrongdoing? Organizations who hire me to 
conduct ethical training obviously hope so, but I think there are limi-
tations to what we can achieve simply by making people familiar with 
tools of ethical analysis. If all it took to establish responsible conduct in 
organizations was ethical tools, this book could have ended here, with 
the presentation of the Navigation Wheel as the final analytic device to 
apply when facing moral dilemmas. Instead, it continues, to attend to 
how even people with excellent analytic skills, well trained in the use 
of the three versions of the categorical imperative and in other ethical 
principles, can become involved in moral wrongdoing at work. Even the 
ancient idea that tough moral decisions can be safely left to people of 
particularly strong and stable moral character, will come under critical 
scrutiny in the remaining chapters.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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From Responsible 
to Responsive
Abstract: To what extent do companies and business 
leaders have responsibilities that go beyond looking after 
the economic interests of their owners and shareholders? 
This chapter investigates that question in the light of a story 
about the owner of an Icelandic fishing company, who has to 
decide whether to maintain activity on four locations in the 
country, or downsize to one location, which appears to be the 
best solution from an economic perspective. The owner can 
analyse his alternatives using the Navigation Wheel, or he 
can apply Archie Carroll’s two models, one focusing on levels 
of corporate responsibility and another identifying corporate 
responsiveness. The former model distinguishes between 
legal, economical, ethical, and philanthropic dimensions of 
responsibility, while the latter conveys how a decision-maker 
in business can choose between four response levels: Reaction, 
defence, accommodation, and pro-action. The Icelandic 
fishing story serves as an illustration of what these alternative 
perspectives can mean in a concrete and practical setting.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0009.
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Hjalti is the CEO of Farsæll, a fishing company in Iceland. The fallen 
price of cod and haddock in the international markets and fierce 
competition from Norway and other countries are making it difficult 
for Farsæll to run the five fishing vessels and four fish processing plants 
located around Iceland. The company has activities in Djúpavogur in the 
east of the country, Húsavík in the north, Þingeyri in the west fjords, and 
in Grindavík in the south west. Increasing demands from the buyers of 
fish products for a flexible product portfolio and shorter time to market 
is also hard to handle with the current business setup.
Hjalti is pondering the suggestion from the chairman of the board to 
close down three of the four fishing plants and concentrate on one loca-
tion. It will give Farsæll more productivity and flexibility, as well as much 
lower labour cost. He also knows that their fish processing plants are 
vital to the local communities where they operate. If they close down the 
plants, up to 50% of the local work force will lose their jobs, not counting 
the related jobs his operations create in supporting companies.
A recent article in the newspaper reported about another Icelandic 
fishing company that had just paid out high dividends to its owners. 
The reaction was very negative and the journalist accused the owners 
of running away from their social responsibilities. The company had 
received the fishing quota for free from the government, based on the 
national policy to support those companies and investors who promise 
to operate in small communities around the country and create jobs. 
Those jobs are very poorly paid, so the value of the quotas seems to go all 
in the pockets of the owners. The press is likely to be even more negative 
if Hjalti decides to close the Farsæll plants around the country, since that 
move will be even more dramatic than the one of not sharing profits with 
the low paid workers.
The situations reminds Hjalti of the words of his father, who never 
tired of telling him how he grew up in Þingeyri and took over the family 
fishing company after having lost his father, Hjalti’s grandfather, at the 
age of 11. Hjalti’s father always said that Þingeyri and the small commu-
nities are the heart of the company. They gave them short access to the 
fishing grounds and a steady and loyal work force. Hjalti knows many of 
these people by name and he knows that they will not have other income 
opportunities if he decides to close down the plants permanently.
Hjalti experiences considerable moral unease and dissonance at the 
thought of closing down the three fishing plants. The decision will nega-
tively affect many people, and due to his personal history and the history 
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of his company, he feels responsible for the outcome for the employees 
and the local communities. One alternative he considers is to sell the 
whole company to an investor. He knows that this investor immediately 
will close down the plants and downsize dramatically. The outcome for 
the population will be the same, but at least it will not be Hjalti’s decision. 
He has to choose one of three alternatives: Either continue as before with 
all four fishing plants, downsize to one plant, or sell the entire company 
to an investor, who will rationalize the setup and close three plants.
The Icelandic philosopher Ketill Berg Magnússon and I have designed 
the story about Hjalti and his company, and we have used it in the teach-
ing of business school students. We have asked the students to analyse 
Hjalti’s alternatives using the Navigation Wheel, and in their eyes, the 
main conflict is between the company’s values and identity and Hjalti’s 
moral convictions on the one hand, and the economic aspects on the 
other. There are no legal obstacles to stop Hjalti from closing down the 
plants, but that in itself does not equip him with a reason to do it. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, the fact that there are no laws against 
a particular course of action, does not in itself constitutes a reason 
for choosing it. Company values and personal moral convictions are 
closely entwined in this case, since Farsæll is a family enterprise that has 
developed over generations, based on shared family values regarding 
community and building up activity together. Hjalti is also likely to be 
concerned about his own reputation, both in the country as a whole, 
and in the local communities in particular, and in the short and long 
term. Of course, he does not want to be remembered and labelled as the 
person who put a stop to social life in the three affected locations. On 
the other hand, Hjalti must also take economic realities seriously. He has 
obligations towards family members to keep the company profitable and 
secure economic stability for future generations bearing his name.
Corporate social responsibility is also a dimension of the Icelandic 
story. To what extent are decision-makers in business responsible for the 
outcomes of their decisions, beyond looking after the shareholders’ and 
employers’ financial interests? One approach can be based on the dictum 
that the business of business is business, a claim attributed to Milton 
Friedman. There is insufficient textual support to claim that Friedman 
actually wrote or said this, but he clearly opposed the idea that business 
leaders should take upon themselves any other responsibilities than 
the ones of generating profitable activity (Friedman, 1962; Friedman, 
1970). He claimed that “there is one and only one social responsibility 
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of business – to use it resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which 
is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud” (Friedman, 1970). From Friedman’s perspective, then, Hjalti 
should choose the economically best alternative, which appears to be 
to close down three fishing plants and concentrate the activity on one 
remaining plant.
Archie Carroll has presented models to analyse the social responsibil-
ity of companies (Carroll, 1979; Carroll, 1991). One of them distinguishes 
between economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic dimensions of 
decision-making, and is similar to the Navigation Wheel in that it offers 
a framework for analysis of alternatives and options. One difference 
is that Carrol provides a ranking of his four dimensions, in that the 
economic and legal are required of the decision-maker, while the ethical 
is expected, but not required, and the philanthropic considerations are 
desired, but neither expected nor required. Applied to Hjalti’s situation, 
the model indicates that he is required to respect the restrictions of law, 
and to make economically sound decisions, while he is only expected to 
take ethical aspects of the situation into account in his decision-making. 
If he decides to be philanthropic and place the concerns for society at the 
forefront, he acts in a manner that is desired from a societal perspective, 
but that goes beyond what is required legally and economically, and also 
beyond what can reasonably be expected of him.
In a second model, Carroll distinguishes between four ways in which 
decision-makers in business can respond to social issues that occur 
in connection with their activities. Responsiveness is a more action-
oriented conceptualization than the one focusing on responsibility. 
Decision-makers in business can be in a position where they have 
identified a social issue, and their corporate social responsiveness can 
be reaction, defence, accommodation, and pro-action (Carroll, 1979, 
p. 501). The first of these responses – reaction – is to deny any respon-
sibility and claim that it is up to the government or other institutions to 
remedy the problem. The defence response consists of reluctantly accept-
ing and taking some minimal responsibility, but mainly for reputational 
purposes, to demonstrate a societal concern that it can be beneficial to 
show towards other stakeholders. If there are no reputational benefits 
to reap from taking an initiative, the company should remain passive, 
according to this line of thinking. The third response is accommodation, 
and it involves listening to affected stakeholders in the situation, and to 
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experts in the field of dealing with such issues, taking up their advice 
about how to deal with it. Finally, the pro-action response is one where 
the decision-makers go beyond industry norms and expectations, and 
shows innovation in coming up with unexpected and brilliant solutions 
to the challenges at hand.
Even Carroll’s responsiveness model offers input to Hjalti and the 
decision he faces. He can choose reaction, and claim that it is not his 
responsibility as a business owner to uphold activities in remote parts 
of Iceland. It is the politicians and the local and national authorities 
who should address that issue. Hjalti can go for defence, and become 
minimally engaged in what happens in the local communities once his 
plants are closed down, or he can involve experts in an accommoda-
tion effort to identify how a company like his can contribute to social 
development in remote communities in Iceland, following their advice. 
Finally, he can choose pro-action, and explore ways to generate activities 
in those communities, making them less dependent on the fishing tradi-
tions of old. He can offer the fishing plant facilities for free or for a very 
low price to entrepreneurs and innovators who can generate other kinds 
on employment in the communities. He can collaborate with education 
providers, who can help his employees to identify and pursue alternative 
careers. All may not be bleak, even though the employment in fishing 
disappears.
It is worth noting that one of the alternatives that Hjalti considers, of 
selling the company and leaving the dirty work of closing down the plant 
to others, is another course of action where utilitarianism and duty ethics 
will offer conflicting advice to the decision-maker. The utilitarian focuses 
on the outcome of the alternatives, and since they in all relevant senses 
appear to be the same, it would not be better, or less worse, for Hjalti to 
sell and leave the unpopular decision to others. Whether he directly or 
only indirectly causes this painful outcome for the local community, is 
morally irrelevant from a utilitarian perspective.
An evaluation from a duty ethics perspective, on the other hand, can 
claim that there is a morally relevant difference between what a person 
does, and what he or she merely lets happen. We are primarily respon-
sible for what we decide actively to do, and not so much for what we 
are passive witnesses to, even though we may have been in a position to 
stop that from happening. Duty ethics also gives emphasis to intention, 
and as noted in Chapter 3, the Doctrine of Double Effect distinguishes 
between intended outcomes and outcomes that are merely foreseen 
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and unfortunate side-effects of a decision or course of action. Hjalti can 
claim that his intention is to make sure the company is profitable, and 
not to hurt the local communities. Duty ethics, then, relieves Hjalti of at 
least some of the moral burden of either closing down the plants himself 
or leaving that to an investor. This ethical theory provides him with the 
opportunity to wash his hands, and claim that the negative outcome is 
merely foreseen and not intended. Utilitarianism offers a more stern 
perspective, since it dismisses both the active – passive distinction, and 
the distinction between intended and foreseen outcomes.
Corporate social responsibility and responsiveness are areas where 
business leaders and employees have to engage in moral reasoning, in 
order to clarify to themselves and others where their priorities should 
lie. It is one thing to agree in general that companies and individuals 
in business have social responsibilities, and another to agree upon 
concrete measures and activities in concrete cases. People, who disagree 
in general about the scope and content of the social responsibilities of 
companies, may agree in particular cases about what a company should 
do. Furthermore, people who agree that corporate social responsibility 
matters and deserves to be high on the agenda, may disagree fiercely 
in particular cases about what a company should do under those given 
circumstances. It is by exploring cases like the one involving Hjalti and 
his decision about the future of his fishing activities that we can go from 
comparing personal moral intuitions and gut feelings to seeing the prin-
cipled dimensions of the roles of business in society.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Loophole Ethics
Abstract: Codes of conduct are statements that commit 
organizations, industries, and professions to particular moral 
values and beliefs, and define appropriate behaviour for 
employees and professionals. This chapter explores how codes 
of conduct can affect the moral reasoning and behaviour in 
the workplace. On the one hand, they clarify the scope of 
action available to decision-makers, but on the other hand, 
they can incentivize people to identify and exploit loopholes 
in the codes. When organizations structure ethics around 
a set of codes defining appropriate behaviour, it can create 
an unforeseen and unwanted form of creativity. Loophole 
ethics is the activity of remaining loyal to the letter of the 
code of conduct, and assume that anything the code is silent 
about, is morally acceptable. The International Federation 
of Accountants operate with a code of ethics that is 162 pages 
long. It increases with each new edition, and the main reason 
for this development seems to be that since the last edition, 
some accountants have identified and exploited a loophole. 
Instead of operating with codes of conduct of increasing 
complexity, professionals and organizations should leave more 
room for the use of personal and common judgment.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0010.
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One practical approach to ethics in organizations is to formulate a set of 
codes, rules, or guidelines to define appropriate and expected behaviour 
from employees. A merit of the code-based approach is that everybody 
can in principle know up front what is morally required and expected 
of them at work. Whenever they are in doubt, they can consult the code 
of conduct and find guidelines there about whether they can accept a 
particular gift from a supplier, invite a customer to a dinner and pay the 
expenses, participate in decision-making where a friend or relative is one 
of the stakeholders, and so on. Codes of conduct can help to clarify the 
boundaries between morally right and wrong in concrete cases, and also 
generate consistency in how employees and professionals behave towards 
each other and stakeholders in the outside world. An organization with 
an established code of conduct can reduce subjectivity and contingency 
in decision-making.
The code-approach is nevertheless problematic. Detailed codes tend 
to signal that the ethical issues have been thought through, once and for 
all. What remains to do is to live by the codes, consulting them whenever 
one is in doubt. In reality, however, each new situation can demand ethi-
cal reflection, based on the realization that the codes may be silent about 
the issue at hand. There is a considerable risk that people interpret the 
silence to mean that anything goes.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how a code-based approach 
to ethics in organizations can have the unfortunate side-effect that 
decision-makers adopt a loophole mentality that is likely to lead to more 
rather than less immoral behaviour. Loophole ethics is the practice 
of looking for an exploiting the options the code of conduct does not 
explicitly mention or deem unacceptable.
Loophole ethics is a phenomenon that often occurs in sports (Kvalnes 
and Hemmestad, 2010). A story about the American ice hockey player 
Sean Avery can serve as an example. On April 13, 2008, his actions on the 
ice in a match for his team New York Rangers led to a rule change and 
also a principled discussion about the nature and purpose of rules and 
codes. During a match against the New Jersey Devils, he placed himself 
in front of Martin Brodeur, the opposing goalkeeper. With his back to 
the play, Avery stared at Brodeur and waved his stick and his hands in 
front of the goalkeeper’s face, in an attempt to distract him and block 
his view. During these proceeding, one of Avery’s team mates came up 
to him and seemed to try to push him away, apparently unhappy with 
this attempt to give the Rangers team a better scoring chance. Avery 
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continued until the attack broke down, went down the ice to participate 
in the preparation for another siege on goal, and in the following move 
actually scored.
Avery could defend his act of blocking the goalkeeper’s view by claim-
ing that he broke no rule by doing so. He would be right. No rule of ice 
hockey forbids a player from distracting the goaltender the way he did. 
However, that changed the day after the match. The ice hockey authori-
ties made a swift response, by introducing a new rule. Collin Campbell, 
National Hockey League director of hockey operations, said in a state-
ment that:
An unsportsmanlike conduct minor penalty will be interpreted and applied, 
effective immediately, to a situation when an offensive player positions himself 
facing the opposition goaltender and engages in actions such as waving his 
arms or stick in front of the goaltender’s face, for the purpose of improperly 
interfering with and/or distracting the goaltender as opposed to positioning 
himself to try to make a play.1
With the new rule in place, any player who attempts to copy Avery’s 
tactic would receive a two minute sending off. The rule quickly got a 
name after the man who initiated it, as The Sean Avery Rule.
Sean Avery’s method of distracting the goalkeeper could not be 
sanctioned on April 13, 2008, since he did not break a particular rule. 
The situation changed on April 14, 2008, when the new rule was in 
place. A loophole had been identified though Avery’s action, and was 
then promptly removed. One potential consequence for the ice hockey 
authorities is that other players will also look for loopholes, in the shape 
of ethically doubtful alternatives that strictly speaking do not violate any 
rules. By responding to Avery’s action the way they did, they inadvert-
ently provided further support for loophole ethics.
What is the alternative? Michael McGeough, an experienced ice 
hockey referee, claimed that he could and would have penalized Avery 
even without the new rule (Paumgarten, 2008). In his eyes, what Avery 
did was unsportsmanlike conduct. A less experienced referee may think 
that he has no right to sanction Avery’s distractions, in the absence 
of a concrete rule. The ice hockey authorities also seemed to share 
this view, since they found it necessary to introduce a new rule. They 
could instead have supported the claim from the experienced referee, 
and agreed that even without a specific rule it was possible to sanction 
Avery’s action. That way they could have signalled that the participants 
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in their sport – players, referees, coaches and others – cannot expect 
the rules to provide explicit answers in every case. Each participating 
individual needs to make his own judgements about the choices he faces, 
and should not use the absence of explicit rules stating that the option is 
wrong, as a justification.
Curling is a sport that has integrated the application of personal judg-
ment. When two teams match up and start to compete, they do so without 
the active presence of a referee. The players settle minor disputes between 
themselves, using common sense. In the unlikely event of a major dispute, 
the players can call upon a referee from the stands, but the normal situ-
ation is that the match of curling starts, enfolds, and ends without any 
interference from a referee. Other sports can take note of how curling has 
placed the exercise of personal judgment at the core of its activity.
Worries about the emergence of loophole ethics in organizations 
belong under the heading of how detailed codes of ethics provide incen-
tives to the people who adhere to them. The philosopher Thomas Pogge 
has given a general account of the nature of loopholes in ethics, and his 
approach can help us to clarify the issue at hand. Its starting point is to 
acknowledge that the concrete ways we think about ethics can have good 
and bad effects, judged by the same ethical standards. We can thus ask 
ourselves: “Have we organized our moral commitments in a way that 
reflects, and helps effectively achieve, what by their own lights matter?” 
(Pogge, 1992, p. 80). If the answer is no, we have good reasons to recon-
sider the ways we think about moral issues, and our ethical approach.
Fair play evidently matters in sports (Loland, 1998, 2002). It is a seri-
ous flaw in the organization of ethical thinking in sports if it provides 
incentives for unfair play. According to Pogge, we cannot establish that 
it has such a flaw simply by showing that some individuals happen to be 
misguided into unfair play as a result of being exposed to our current 
system of moral commitments. They may simply be foolish people who 
fail to grasp the incentives in a proper and reasonable manner. The 
relation between the code and the conduct must be tighter in order to 
establish that we are in the presence of a loophole:
A loophole only exists if the connection between the code and the regret-
tability of the conduct it encourages is tight in two respects. First, the relevant 
incentive must be an ideal one, so that the code can be said to guide agents 
towards the regrettable conduct. Second, the conduct must be regrettable in 
itself, rather than in virtue of any further effects it may bring about, however 
predictably. (Pogge, 1992, pp. 83–84)
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Does the Sean Avery example meet the two requirements for being a 
loophole case? His conduct can be interpreted as an example of unfair 
play, as suggested by referee Michael McGeough, and thus regrettable by 
the ethical standards of sports. It is regrettable in itself, so it meets the 
second criterion. Is it, in addition, the case that the code guides Avery 
towards the unwanted conduct he engages in? Does the code provide 
incentives to stand in front of the goalkeeper and distract him?
We can reflect on these questions in the light of a distinction Pogge 
draws between two kinds of incentives: Compliance incentives and 
reward incentives. With the former, the sole motivation to act in a 
particular way comes from the commitment to adhere to the code. 
When Avery distracts the goalkeeper, it is not an action motivated by a 
wish to adhere to the code of conduct within ice hockey. The code does 
not provide him with a compliance incentive to act that way.
Reward incentives are active when adherents to a code of conduct 
“are motivated by other, code-independent interests of theirs insofar as 
these can be pursued without violating requirements of the code. Here a 
code encourages conduct by affecting the official pay-offs: eligibility for 
benefits or liability to burdens” (Pogge, 1992, p. 82). Avery had a reward 
incentive to distract the goalkeeper. The interest to have one’s team win 
is a standard interest of players, and Avery pursued this interest within 
the scope defined by the rules that were in place on April 13.
The rule-based approach to ethics in sports is in danger of encour-
aging unfair play not due to its specific content, but through its form. 
When we organize moral commitments in comprehensive codes of 
conduct, people it can lead people into thinking that all they need to do 
is to stay clear of any alternative that the code explicitly singles out as 
morally forbidden. Thus, they have reward incentives to act in ways that 
are regrettable and bad, even according to the ethical outlook that allows 
them to act in that manner.
Ethical rules and regulations do not necessarily lead people to look 
for and exploit loopholes, but there is a considerable risk that they may 
promote and encourage actions that even according to the rule-makers 
themselves are regrettable. I have explored how this phenomenon can 
occur in the relation between insurance companies and their custom-
ers. Dishonest behaviour from customers can be a loophole response to 
detailed, small print insurance documents (Kvalnes, 2011). One way to 
avoid loophole ethics can be to rely less on detailed rules, and more on 
personal judgment and practical wisdom. This approach does not allow 
10.1057/9781137532619 - Moral Reasoning at Work, Øyvind Kvalnes
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ed
 fr
o
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 n
pg
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
v
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
15
-1
1-
02
60 Moral Reasoning at Work
DOI: 10.1057/9781137532619.0010
the agent to justify his actions simply by pointing to the fact that there 
are no rules explicitly defining his choice as wrong.
A rule-based approach to ethics has a strong foothold in many profes-
sions and organizations. The accounting company Arthur Andersen had 
Enron as its client. Both companies collapsed, and the accountants came 
under criticism for their close personal and economic ties to the people 
they were controlling (Nanda, 2002i). They had not actually violated the 
code of conduct for the profession, but behaved unwisely. The response 
from the profession itself and the financial authorities has been to 
formulate more detailed ethical rules and regulations for accounting. 
The Enron case exposed loopholes in the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (CEPA).2 A former Enron accountant has admitted that 
the loophole mentality was part of the cognitive setup in the working 
environment. They complied with the rule-based framework, and found 
creative and dubious solutions not mentioned as unacceptable in the 
rules. “All the rules create all these opportunities. We got to where we did 
because we exploited that weakness” (McLean and Elkin, 2003, p. 142). 
After the Enron downfall, the loopholes were identified and removed by 
adding new codes. At the beginning of this century the CEPA document 
consisted of 98 pages. In the recently revised version from 2014 it has 
been expanded further, to 162 pages.
Critical voices within the finance sector have started to argue that the 
preferred rule-based approach may not only be insufficient as a response 
to ethical challenges, but may also make matters worse, by encouraging 
what I have labelled as loophole ethics. The critics recommend a change 
from a rule-based to a principle-based approach (Somerville, 2003; Satava 
et al., 2006). There is a call for guidance through a limited set of general 
principles, rather than through comprehensive and detailed rules. One 
advantage of such a move can be to limit the scope of reward incentives. 
The agent’s personal interests will remain intact, but he will now have a 
harder job defending and justifying a choice to pursue them in the light 
of the code’s silence on the matter. A move away from comprehensive 
codes towards a limited set of general principles changes the logic of the 
justification requirement. You now have to take more of a personal stand 
in the process of justifying your choice. It is not enough to scan the code 
in search of explicit mentions of the options you have available.
Organizations, professions, and authorities face a common challenge 
in taking steps to avoid loophole ethics. In accounting, the strategy of 
adding new rules to make the overall code more comprehensive has 
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had the unfortunate side-effect that people act as if the relevant moral 
thinking has already been performed by the rule-makers. In sports, the 
tendency to rely on rules is not yet as strong as in the accounting sector. 
People within sports can look to accounting if they need a concrete 
scenario of what lies ahead if they take the rule-approach further, and 
continue in the pattern suggested by the authorities in The National 
Hockey League, by constantly expanding on the rules.
Moral reasoning in organizations needs to strike a balance between 
written rules and codes on the one hand, and wise personal and commu-
nal judgement on the other. Shorter and more general codes leave more 
room and responsibility to the individual decision-makers to apply their 
own judgement to the case at hand. Such codes signal to the decision-
makers that they need to use their common sense to figure out what 
is right and wrong in the situation they face. The problem with this 
approach in organizations can be the appearance that common sense is 
not so common anymore. The general idea can be that moral outlooks 
tend to be more fragmented and disparate than they used to be, and 
codes of conduct are the best tool to compensate for that. We cannot 
take for granted that people interpret and judge situations similarly, and 
consider the same aspects of it to be morally relevant. Differences in 
cultural background, and generational and gender difference add to the 
moral confusion. When top management in organizations have doubts 
like these, codes appear to offer the most promising solution. Eagerness 
to compensate for an apparent lack of common sense and judgement can 
then create a foundation for loophole ethics.
Notes
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/playoffs2008/news/story?id=3346729.1 
http://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/2014-handbook-code-ethics-2 
professional-accountants.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Conflict of Interest
Abstract: At the core of ethics in professions is the ability to 
cope with conflict of interest situations. The professional has 
a primary duty to look after the interest of the client, and 
a secondary duty to serve his or her personal interests. The 
client is normally not in a position to evaluate the quality 
of the service on offer. Due to the knowledge gap, a lawyer, 
accountant, consultant, doctor, or teacher can be in a position 
to give priority to self-interest over the interest of the person 
who receives the services, without detection. Some professions 
operate with more or less explicit pledges to the clients not to 
do exploit their advantage in knowledge: “Trust me; although 
my own self-interest might dictate other actions, I undertake 
to serve in your best interest.” A conflict of interest situation 
is different from a real moral dilemma in that it does not 
constitute a choice between moral values that are on more or 
less the same equal footing, but are instead false dilemmas, 
in the sense of being temptations to choose the morally wrong 
option at the expense of the morally right one.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0011.
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When the international partners of one of the world’s leading consul-
tancy firms met for a seminar some years ago, a facilitator asked them 
to consider the following situation: Their company has agreed to do a 
project for a client for the price of 1,000,000 Euro, based on an hourly 
price and an estimated use of working hours. As the project comes to a 
close, the project manager can see that the hourly price multiplied with 
the actual number of working hours will give a total price of 700,000 
Euro. Due to some wise decisions and clever thinking underway, the 
company will deliver a quality project with lower input in terms of work-
ing hours. The project manager is uncertain about how this should affect 
the invoice she sends to the client. She considers three options:
Send an invoice for the agreed 1,000,000 Euro.A 
Send an invoice for 700,000 Euro.B 
Add extra work useful for the client, so the working hours add up C 
to 1,000,000 Euro, and send an invoice for that amount.
When the consulting firm partners heard this story, they stood in the 
middle of a room, with no furniture. They were told to think individu-
ally about the decision for a brief moment, and then decide to move to 
one of three corners of the room, each representing the three options the 
project manager faced. The outcome was that all three options received 
considerable support, as the partners placed themselves evenly in the 
three available corners.
The participants in this exercise had to make a decision without full 
information about the situation, and the differences in their behaviour 
may be due to variations in how they interpreted it. It is unclear what 
sort of contract the company had with the client, whether it was a fixed 
price contract or one where the price would be calculated retrospectively, 
when the actual number of hours was known. Those who moved to the 
A corner may have interpreted the situation to be of the former kind, 
while those who moved to corners B and C may have interpreted it to 
be of the latter kind. In the ensuing discussion, it became clear that the 
company could face situations of this nature, where there was ambiguity 
in the contract and in the expectations from the client. There was also 
disagreement about how openly they would and should share infor-
mation about working hours with the client. What should the project 
manager say to the client if she sent a 1,000,000 Euro invoice and the 
client later inquired about the number of working hours? One partner 
claimed that this provided an opportunity to demonstrate client loyalty. 
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A combination of transparency and an invoice for the lowest sum could 
generate more work for the same client at a later stage. In terms from 
the Navigation Wheel, it made good economic and reputational sense to 
share information with the client and invoice for 700,000 Euro.
The project manager in the example faces a conflict of interest situ-
ation, where she must choose between prioritizing the client’s interest 
or her company’s interest. As a provider of professional services, the 
company has a primary duty to look after the client’s interest, and a 
secondary duty to serve its own interest. Typically, the client will not 
have the knowledge or insight necessary to judge whether his or her 
interest is at the forefront when the provider performs its services. It is 
difficult for a non-professional to determine whether an accountant, a 
lawyer, a teacher, a doctor, or a financial advisor delivers work of the 
required quality, and puts client interest first. Due to the knowledge gap, 
the professional can often give priority to his or her own interest, without 
much fear of detection.
Nanda (2002ii) places conflict of interest at the core of ethics in profes-
sions, and emphasizes how information asymmetry and knowledge 
gaps can create temptations to give priority to self-interest over client 
interest. It is one thing to be transparent and open when the client has 
the resources critically to evaluate what you are doing, and quite another 
thing to be so when the client is wholly lacking in professional knowl-
edge. The pattern is present in private as well as public services, and is 
a pervasive feature whenever someone with a specialized and superior 
knowledge offers to look after less qualified people’s interests and needs. 
Some professions operate with more or less explicit pledges to the clients 
not to do exploit the knowledge gap. “Trust me; although my own self-
interest might dictate other actions, I undertake to serve in your best 
interest.” Doctors and lawyers are amongst the professions who have 
institutionalized pledges of this kind. In other professions, there is more 
of an implicit expectancy that the client gets what he or she needs, and 
that professional decisions are not dictated by the professional’s self-
interest.
Accountants are supposed to look after not only their clients’ inter-
est, but also the interest of other stakeholders who depend on correct 
financial information from the clients. In the Enron case, the account-
ants in Arthur Andersen assisted their client in hiding financial losses, 
by using mark-to-market accounting (Nanda, 2002i). By applying this 
accounting method, Enron could hide losses and appear to be a more 
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profitable company than it actually was (McLean and Elkin, 2003). In 
the aftermath of the collapse of both Enron and its accounting firm, new 
legislation forced the companies to implement stricter and more reliable 
accounting practices. What remains unchanged, however, is a system 
where accountants are supposed to control and be critical of financial 
information coming from clients who pay their fees to do so. The system 
can be likened to one where athletes pay their own doping controllers, 
and have the freedom to sack them and hire new ones if they are not 
satisfies with the service they get. In sports, a system of this kind would 
be unacceptable, since it would lead to doubt about the reliability and 
objectivity of the controls. The doping controllers would be under pres-
sure to look the other way when the athletes were preparing for competi-
tion, since they otherwise risked losing their jobs. With the principle 
of equality in hand, we can challenge the accountants to identify the 
morally relevant difference between their own relation to clients, and 
that of doping controllers’ relation to athletes under such a system. If 
the system is unacceptable in sports, it is equally so in finance, unless 
there is a morally relevant difference between them. I have yet to hear an 
adequate explanation of how accounting is different from the hypotheti-
cal sports system outlined here.
Ethics training with professionals and with students who are preparing 
to become professionals generally take the form of teaching them ways 
to analyse moral dilemmas. They become familiar with the Navigation 
Wheel and other tools to weight and consider the alternatives open to 
them in a moral dilemma. I contribute to such learning processes, and 
see the practical use of teaching the participants to think clearly about 
their options, in the light of ethical concepts and theories. However, the 
most challenging situations individual professionals or groups of profes-
sionals meet may not be ones where it is intellectually hard to identify the 
right choice. It may instead be situations where they have to recognize 
and deal with conflicts of interest, as when the client demands that an 
accountant accepts a dubious form of financial reporting, and threatens 
to go to another accountant if he does not get his way. These situations 
are not real moral dilemmas, since they do not constitute a choice 
between moral values that are more or less on equal footing. Instead, 
they are false dilemmas, temptations to do wrong rather than right.
The financial sector has been under scrutiny for dubious handlings of 
conflict of interest. To what extent can the client of a financial advisor 
expect to receive services that put his or her interests at the forefront? 
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Greg Smith added fuel to the criticism of the financial sector when he 
quit his job as an executive at the investment bank Goldman Sachs and 
published his resignation letter in the New York Times on March 14, 2012. 
Smith had been an employee at the bank for twelve years, and wrote that 
he had “always taken a lot of pride in advising my clients to do what I 
believe is right for them, even if it means less money for the firm.” It had 
gradually become more difficult for him to work in accordance with that 
principle, as the company culture became more toxic and destructive. In 
the published resignation letter he wrote:
I attend derivatives sales meetings where not one single minute is spent 
asking questions about how we can help clients. It’s purely about how we can 
make the most possible money off of them. If you were an alien from Mars 
and sat in on one of these meetings, you would believe that a client’s success 
or progress was not part of the thought process at all. It makes me ill how 
callously people talk about ripping their clients off.
Smith eventually released a book with his story of why he quit Goldman 
Sachs (Smith, 2012) and it generated renewed public skepticism about 
the handling of conflicts of interest in the financial sector. Smith’s own 
motivation for going public also came under critical light, as it appeared 
that he had recently been turned down for promotion and pay raise at the 
company. Former colleagues claimed that his criticism was unfounded, 
and that it merely was an expression of frustration over the slowness of 
his own career movements at the bank. It seemed that he would have 
been able to tolerate the alleged company culture of ripping off clients, if 
only his pay and position in the company had been high enough.1 Other 
commentators focused on Smith’s inside reports about cynical treatment 
of clients, especially those who were novices in the world of finance, and 
found them credible.
The crucial issue when it comes to conflict of interest, in finance 
and elsewhere, is incentives. My own impression based on a range of 
dialogues with financial advisors in Norway is that there is a tension 
between the official claim that client interests come first, and the practi-
cal incentives in the industry. Top management in the banks claim that 
things have improved after the financial crisis in 2008, and documenta-
tion of sales of dubious financial products to clients. Post-crisis, I have 
had sessions with financial advisors and asked them if they would ever 
advise someone to make a financial transaction that is best for him 
or her (the client), and only second best for the financial institution. 
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The question promotes hesitancy and reflection, and I try to be more 
concrete, by using the example from the first chapter in this book: A 
client has recently inherited 200,000 Euro from a relative, and comes for 
financial advice. The considered opinion of the financial advisor is that 
the smartest thing this person can do is to use the entire sum to reduce 
her debt. This option generates no income to the financial institution, 
and not personal bonus to the advisor. The pressure is on to get the client 
to buy a financial product and it is likely that the advice will be to do just 
that, particularly if the client is a financial novice and will be unable to 
evaluate the professional quality of the advice.
If top management in professional services organizations really want 
to signal that client interest comes first, they need to go over incentive 
systems in detail, and make sure they do not generate temptations to 
prioritize self-interest over client interest. They also need to demonstrate 
a willingness in concrete situations to forgo company and personal 
profits at the expense of what is best for the client. Another option in 
the financial sector is to change the label on the individuals who are 
in dialogue with clients about what they ought to do with their money 
from financial advisor to financial salesperson. That would make it clear 
to people who turn up to have a conversation about their economy that 
they cannot expect client-oriented behaviour from the person on the 
other side of the table, but instead a presentation of financial products 
that person has an interest in selling.
I have discussed conflict of interest with a range of professionals, 
amongst them dentists. In 2011, the Norwegian Consumer Council 
cooperated with the Faculty of Odontology at the University of Oslo to 
test the professional advice given by dentists in the Oslo area (Norwegian 
Consumer Council, 2001). Four patients first had their teeth analysed 
by professors of odontology, and then went to 20 different dentists (five 
each) to ask for analysis and a written recommendation for treatment. 
The results showed considerable differences in the treatment suggested 
by the dentists. Patients experienced pushy professionals, dentists who 
wanted to start treatment immediately, even if the problems were of the 
sort that according to the prior analysis should be treated at a later stage. 
Dentists failed to distinguish clearly between tooth issues that must, 
should and could be treated, three categories that the health authorities 
require dentists to operate with. One of the patients got recommenda-
tion from one dentist to nothing with her teeth, and recommenda-
tion for treatment costing 3000 Euro from another. Only three of the 
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twenty dentists passed the test of giving adequate recommendations for 
treatment.
In ethics sessions with dentists I have asked them to identify situations 
where conflict of interest can be a challenge for them (Kvalnes, 2015). 
One of them answered: “For someone who is good with the hammer, 
everything looks like a nail.” His point was that a dentist will prefer to 
use the method he or she prefers, rather than the method best suited to 
remedy the particular patient’s problem. Dentists in the private sector 
have economic incentives to change old fillings, and may suggest doing 
that even in situations where the best thing for the patient is to leave 
them as they are. Dentists in the public sector do not have incentives 
to over-treat their patients, but may instead have a personal interest in 
under treating a patient. The patient may be uncooperative and difficult, 
and the dentist can be tempted to say that there is nothing wrong with 
his or her teeth. Even in this profession, the knowledge gap creates situa-
tions where there is a discrepancy between the professional’s interest and 
the client’s interest, and the former can prioritize as he or she chooses, 
without being found out by the latter.
How can business schools and other educational institutions prepare 
students for conflict of interest situations? How can they create aware-
ness of the moral obligation to prioritize the client’s interest over self-
interest? Integrating ethics in professions in the curriculum can be one 
significant step, but may not be sufficient. Sumantra Ghoshal has argued 
that business schools need to revise radically the theories about human 
nature that students hear in the auditoriums (Ghoshal, 2005). He is 
critical of what he calls the basic assumption of mainstream economics, 
which is that human beings are self-interest maximizers. The teachers 
at business schools tell their students that a rational human being will 
analyse each situation in terms of “what’s in it for me?” and choose the 
option that they believe will serve their self-interest. Repeated mentions 
of the so-called Homo economicus assumption can make it come true:
If a theory assumes that the sun goes round the earth, it does not change 
what the sun actually does. So, if the theory is wrong, the truth is preserved 
for discovery by someone else. In contrast, a management theory – if it gains 
sufficient currency – changes the behaviours of managers who start acting in 
accordance with the theory. A theory that assumes that people can behave 
opportunistically and draws its conclusions for managing people from that 
assumption can induce managerial actions that are likely to enhance oppor-
tunistic behaviour among people. (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 77)
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Theories about human beings, then, can actually have an impact on the 
object of research. Empirical studies show that business school student 
do indeed tend to live and decide in accordance with the theory that 
human beings are self-interest maximizers (Ferraro et al., 2005; Gandal 
et al., 2005; Molinsky et al., 2012). The educational systems need to take 
this tendency seriously. Ghoshal argues convincingly that adding ethics 
courses to the curriculum is not sufficient, since faculty keeps the Homo 
economicus assumption alive in the standards courses in economics. His 
contribution sparked a debate about the effects of teaching and theory on 
business school students (Gapper, 2005; Hambrick, 2005; Kanter, 2005). 
Here we can add that students who learn that it is always rational to 
prioritize self-interest will be badly equipped to decide and act responsi-
bly in conflict of interest situations.
The behavioural psychologist Dan Ariely tells an interesting personal 
story about conflict of interest in a public talk on honesty (Ariely, 
2012ii). When I first saw a photograph of Ariely, I though there had 
to be something wrong with it, since his face looked odd, with blank 
skin on the right side of his face, and ordinary skin with beard stub-
bles on the left side. It turns out that Ariely was badly burnt in an 
accident many years ago. His story about conflict of interest is about 
what happens when he goes to the hospital to see a physician who has 
treated him over a long time. On this visit, the physician introduced 
him to a fantastic new treatment that he thought would be ideal for 
Ariely. It consisted in using technology to tattoo artificial stubbles on 
the blank parts of his facial skin, making him look more symmetrical. 
The physician showed him pictures of two patients who have taken the 
treatment already, and demonstrated the likeness between the real stub-
bles and the artificial ones. After careful consideration, Ariely decided 
not to go for this treatment. His answer provoked a shocking response 
from the physician, who verbally attacked him and tried to instil guilt 
in his patient. “What’s wrong with you? Do you get some pleasure from 
being asymmetrical? Do you enjoy looking different?” Ariely could not 
understand the fierceness of this response. He asked a hospital deputy 
about it, who explained that the physician was working on an academic 
paper about the treatment, and desperately needed a third patient to 
take it in order to make the paper publishable in a prestigious journal. 
That was his motivation for putting pressure on his asymmetrical 
patient. Ariely sees this as an example of how an excellent physician and 
a wonderful human being can become a prisoner of his own conflict of 
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interest, trying to coerce his patient into doing something that is good 
for physician and not for the patient.
A traditional approach to ethics in organizations is that people of weak 
moral character are the primary cause of misbehaviour in the workplace. 
In the category of moral culprits at work, we find the financial advisor 
who sells products to a client who would have been better off reducing 
her debt, the dentists who deliberately either over- or undertreat their 
patients, and the physician who tries to coerce a patient to tattoo stubble 
on his cheeks. One view, then, is that these people are morally deviant 
and weak, lacking the personal moral fibre to withstand temptations. 
In the next chapter we shall see that this character approach comes 
under pressure from experimental studies in social and moral psychol-
ogy, which indicate that circumstances have at least as much predictive 
power as character. The people who are guilty of wrongdoing at work 
can be ordinary leaders and employees, with ordinary moral standards 
and convictions. Experiments in this research stream gives us reasons 
to doubt that weak moral character is the most plausible explanation to 
moral misbehaviour in organizations. Rather, moral wrongdoing at work 
is something anyone can become involved in, if they are unfortunate with 
the circumstances they encounter, and the support, encouragement and 
critical feedback they get from colleagues in their working environment.
Note
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012–10-18/greg-smith-quit-1 
goldman-after-unrealistic-pitch-for-1m.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Character and Circumstances
Abstract: In the tradition of virtue ethics, moral wrongdoing 
at work and elsewhere is explained in terms of weakness of 
character. On this view, a person who prioritizes self-interest over 
client interest and engages in other kinds of moral transgressions 
exposes him- or herself to be someone of dubious moral character. 
A response within this tradition to ethical scandals in business 
has been to call for authentic leadership, exercised by individuals 
who consistently embody firmness of character. Experimental 
studies in social and moral psychology have put the virtue 
ethical assumptions regarding moral wrongdoing under pressure, 
suggesting that circumstances affect decision-making and conduct 
to a high degree. An empirically oriented ethics in organizations 
should take into account that character and circumstances 
both affect conduct. When morally questionable behaviour in 
professions and organizations are exposed, it will not be enough 
to kick the culprits out and substitute them with morally clean 
and authentic individuals. Earmarking leadership for morally 
strong and authentic individuals may be a futile endeavour. 
Circumstances, often in the shape of incentives and decision-
making structures, are significant causes of wrongdoing, and 
revising them appears to be the most promising measure to create 
responsible and fair organizations.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0012.
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Professionals and other individuals in organizations face decisions all 
along the scale from real to false moral dilemmas. In some cases, it can 
be a struggle to decide what is the morally right or the least morally 
wrong option, since all available options involve the sacrifice of some-
thing of considerable moral importance. In other cases, it is obvious 
to the decision-maker what he or she should do from a moral point of 
view, but it is tempting to do something else, since it would enhance self-
interest in some way. The financial advisor needs another big sale before 
Monday’s meeting with her supervisor, and the client who just walked in 
the door is both rich and blind to economic realities.
As a client, customer, or patient, you hope that the professional will 
provide advice based on what is in your best interest, and not in the 
professional’s own interest. In this chapter, I explore two alternative 
approaches to what that hope of experiencing responsible conduct 
in organizations can build upon. The first approach maintains that 
the foundation for such conduct is the decision-makers’ character: 
Professionals and their leaders need consistently to embody principles 
of integrity, responsibility, compassion, and forgiveness in order to 
behave decently at work (Kiel, 2015). When a person fails or struggles 
to live in accordance with these principles, it is a sign of personal moral 
weakness. That person needs to work on his or her moral constitution, 
or alternatively find work elsewhere, in positions where the personal 
moral shortcomings cannot be harmful in the sense of leading to seri-
ous moral wrongdoing. The second approach claims that we should 
be less concerned about character, and more about the circumstances 
the professional works under. A range of studies in social psychology 
document that aspects of the situation have a strong impact on whether 
a person engages in moral misconduct or not. The social environment 
affects decision-making and conduct to a stronger degree than what the 
character perspective acknowledges.
Virtue ethics has identified the central individual factor concern-
ing ethical decision-making to be a person’s moral character, or set of 
stable and reliable virtues. A person of strong character can withstand 
temptations to engage in wrongdoing, while a person of weak character 
is unreliable in this sense. In recent years, virtue ethics has influenced 
significant developments in ethics in organizations as well as leadership 
studies, in the aftermath of scandals of moral wrongdoing in companies. 
Concerned scholars and practitioners have responded to the widespread 
examples of immoral behaviour amongst leaders and professionals 
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by promoting ideals of authentic leadership (Gardner et al. 2011). One 
basic assumption in this research field is that great leadership requires 
great character (Kiel, 2015). On this view, the leaders need consistently 
to embody virtuous character traits in their everyday dealings with 
employees and other stakeholders. By doing so they can serve as good 
role models in their organizations and contribute to making responsible 
conduct the normal way to behave in the workplace. Kiel (2015) also 
suggests that leaders of morally strong character generate more income 
to their companies. However, the causal relation may also go the other 
way. The study in question documents that companies with leaders 
who are perceived to be morally strong outperform those with leaders 
who are perceived to be morally weak, but it may be easier to embody 
virtuous character traits when you are in charge of a successful company 
rather than a struggling one where you can have economic incentives to 
cut corners.
The concept of authenticity has ancient roots, and is integral to the 
Socratic notion of knowing yourself. An authentic person is someone 
with a high degree of self-awareness, who acts in accordance with his 
true self by expressing what he genuinely thinks and believes. Aristotle 
defined self-realization and well-being – eudaimonia – as a state of happi-
ness where the person acts and lives in accordance with who he really is. 
Crucially constitutive of eudaimonia is the exercise of virtues. Only people 
who possess virtues like courage, honesty, and loyalty will truly flourish 
and be happy in the eudaimonian sense. To be a virtuous person is to 
have a certain kind of mindset, a deeply entrenched set of dispositions to 
act in a particular manner. A truly honest person does not tell the truth 
out of blind habit, because it is the best way to make a good impression on 
others, or out of fear of the consequences of being caught in a lie. Rather, 
the honest person thinks that “it is the truth” is a particularly strong – if 
not always overriding – reason for speaking the truth. Similarly, a virtu-
ous doctor considers “this is the right treatment for my patient” to be a 
particularly strong reason for providing that particular treatment to the 
patient, overriding self-interest and other considerations.
Virtue can come in degrees. Aristotle distinguished between full 
virtue, where an honest person tells the truth without experiencing any 
trace of a contrary temptation to lie, and less than full virtue where the 
person telling the truth has to overcome a desire to do otherwise. The 
latter is also an honest person, as long as his reasons for telling the truth 
are not opportunistic, but based on a conviction that telling the truth is 
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the morally right option. Immanuel Kant considered the act of overcom-
ing one’s desires to do the right thing to be more praiseworthy than acts 
where there was full harmony between reason and inclination, and the 
decision-maker could behave correctly without inner struggle.
Various accounts of authentic leadership share with virtue ethics an 
assumption about firmness of character. How will the leader respond to 
an opportunity to earn quick money by acting against his moral convic-
tions? The standard answer from virtue ethics is that it depends on the 
stability and robustness of leader’s character. If he is an authentic leader, 
or so the contributors to this field of research argue, internal moral 
standards will guide his decisions and conduct, and he will thus not give 
in to temptation.
Empirical research in social psychology indicates that the character-
oriented approach has underestimated how circumstances affect 
decision-making. Aspects of the situation often appear to override char-
acter in affecting a person’s response to a moral challenge. A range of 
experiments has demonstrated that circumstances influence what people 
actually do when they face a moral test (Alderman 1972; Isen 1987; Baron 
1997), and Doris (2002) has outlined how these studies indicate the need 
for a more empirically informed ethics.
The Good Samaritan experiment, designed and executed by Darley 
and Batson at Princeton University, provides material for one of the most 
notable studies on character and circumstances (Darley and Batson, 
1973). Theology students were individually told to walk to another part 
of campus, in order to do a presentation on The Good Samaritan story 
from the Bible. One third of the students were told that they needed to 
hurry up to get to the building in time, another third that they were just 
on time, and the final third that they were early and had plenty of time. 
On the way to the other building, the students encountered a person 
lying on the pavement in pain, needing assistance, in parallel with the 
actual Good Samaritan story. The researches wanted to test whether the 
differences in the students’ hurry to reach the other building would make 
a difference to their helping behaviour. If character is the most influential 
factor, then there should be only minor differences. In the experiment, 
only 10% of the students in a hurry offered to help, 45% of students who 
were on time and 63% of those who were early made helping initiatives to 
the person in pain (Darley and Batson, 1973, p. 105). The results indicate 
that circumstances have a strong influence on conduct, and may have 
more predictive power than character.
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Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) set up an experiment to test whether 
moral reminders would affect cheating amongst students. A total of 
229 students participated. They were asked to perform math tasks, and 
were given opportunities to cheat when reporting on the results of their 
individual performances. Before the test, the respondents were asked to 
write down either the names of ten books they had read in high school 
(no moral reminder) or the Ten Commandments (moral reminder). The 
outcome was that the respondents in the first group of students showed 
normal cheating behaviour, while all the respondents in the second 
group refrained from cheating. Evoking the Ten Commandments served 
as a moral reminder, and eliminated cheating. Even this study provides 
support to the view that circumstances can have a more profound influ-
ence on conduct than character. It also gives us reasons to be optimistic 
about the effects of encouraging people to think about ethics and values. 
Some of the participants in my ethics training sessions report that they 
have taken photocopies of the Navigation Wheel and distributed them 
amongst colleagues. It seems that such an initiative can serve a positive 
purpose beyond being a tool for ethical analysis. Seeing the Wheel on 
one’s desk or on the wall in the office may serve as a modest reminder of 
the normative dimensions of decision-making, and as such be a circum-
stantial component in a work environment where you expect people 
to behave responsibly. The cognitive purpose of the Wheel and similar 
tools is to assist analysis of complex situations, while it appears that the 
emotional purpose can be to serve as moral reminders.
The character approach to moral wrongdoing advises organizations to 
identify, recruit, and develop people with particularly firm moral char-
acter. These will be the people to trust in morally critical and demanding 
situations. The alternative circumstance approach suggests that a more 
realistic scenario is one where organizations choose their leaders from 
a pool of people who are neither particularly good nor particularly bad 
at coping with moral challenges. They are likely to be ordinary people, 
vulnerable to ambiguity, uncertainty, and temptation in their decision-
making. The leaders will encounter situations where they experience 
moral doubt and confusion, and can face moral dilemmas where there is 
no harmonious way out. Something of moral value will have to give way. 
They can also face temptations to act against their own moral convictions. 
In such critical situations, it can be useful for leaders to possess knowledge 
from moral psychology about the circumstances and processes that can 
lead people to act in opposition to their beliefs about right and wrong.
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Tension between a character and a circumstance approach to 
wrongdoing has also been a feature in criminology and the alternative 
explanations of why people commit crimes. From a character perspec-
tive, criminals have been understood to be fundamentally different from 
ordinary people. Their lawbreaking activities are interpreted as proof that 
they are somehow morally and socially defective. In many cases, crimi-
nals are branded as “insane, inadequate, immoral, impulsive, egocentric” 
despite a lack of evidence to support such assumptions (Coleman, 1989, 
p. 200). Criminologists Sykes and Matza (1957) developed an alternative 
model for understanding criminal activities, claiming that the criminals 
were committed to more or less the same moral standards and norms 
as their fellow non-criminal citizens. The main difference was that the 
criminals had managed to convince themselves that breaking the law 
was actually acceptable, through processes of what the researchers called 
moral neutralization. Initially, they may have been morally ill at ease at 
the thought of breaking into other people’s homes, but gradually they 
were able to justify to themselves that it was acceptable to do so after all. 
Through interviews with juvenile delinquents, Sykes and Matza identified 
how individuals in this group used moral neutralization techniques to 
distance themselves from their original misgivings. In the next chapter, 
I argue that ethics in organizations can benefit from adopting a parallel 
way of understanding wrongdoing. By doing so it can move beyond a 
simplistic call for authentic leadership and firm character, and instead 
supplement the character approach with an emphasis on how one can 
shape an organizational culture to be alert against attempts to neutralize 
moral dissonance and thereby normalize questionable behaviour.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Moral Neutralization
Abstract: Criminologists Sykes and Matza developed a 
conceptual framework in which to explain and understand 
juvenile delinquency. They challenged the virtue ethical 
assumption that criminals are primarily morally deviant 
individuals, and instead suggested that crimes can be 
the result of processes where individuals with ordinary 
moral beliefs and convictions have been able to convince 
themselves that their actions are morally acceptable. This 
chapter adopts a similar approach to moral wrongdoing in 
organizations, and explains how it can be a process where 
initial moral dissonance gives way to acceptance through a 
process of moral neutralization. Sykes and Matza defined 
five techniques juvenile delinquents applied to overcome the 
queasiness of acting against their moral convictions: Denial or 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation 
of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalty. All of these 
can be active in workplaces where people experience 
dissonance between their moral beliefs and what they are 
tempted or ordered to do. A significant dimension of ethics in 
organizations is to be alert to neutralization attempts, and to 
be ready to challenge and question them.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0013.
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The concept of moral neutralization, derived from criminology, can 
contribute to the understanding of wrongdoing in organizations. Heath 
(2008) has argued that straightforward criminality has been at the core 
of the dramatic events that sparked renewed interest in business ethics:
(A)ll the talk of ‘ethical scandals’ in the early years of the twenty-first century 
has been very misleading, since what really took place at corporations like 
Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and elsewhere was, first and foremost, an 
outbreak of high-level, large-scale white collar crime. (Heath, p. 595)
Heath goes on to argue that business and organizational ethics can learn 
from criminology in trying to understand the reasoning and motivation 
of people who have been involved in wrongdoing.
Sykes and Matza (1957) introduced the concept of neutralization in 
connection with studies of juvenile delinquency, and identified five cate-
gories of techniques used by offenders to neutralize and deny the wrong-
ness of their actions: Denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of 
victim, condemnation of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. I 
will present them in further detail below. A person can face a situation 
where it is tempting to act in a way that he from the outset believes to be 
morally wrong. Moral neutralization is the cognitive process of convinc-
ing oneself that it is morally acceptable to choose that option after all. 
The basic assumption of Sykes and Matza, and later adaptations of moral 
neutralization is that “people do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible 
conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their 
actions” (Bandura et al., 1996, p. 365).
A person who engages in moral neutralization has initially experienced 
moral dissonance, a conflict between the option to act in a particular 
manner and the person’s moral convictions. In music, dissonance is 
the simultaneous emission of two or more disharmonious sounds. The 
general term of cognitive dissonance applies to the discomfort of holding 
conflicting cognitions. Festinger et al. (1956) used it to depict the cogni-
tive struggles of a UFO cult who believed in impending apocalypse, and 
had to take in a reality where it did not happen. The concept of moral 
dissonance describes a situation where a person has the option to act 
against his moral commitments and convictions. A conscientious athlete 
who faces an opportunity to use illegal drugs to improve performances 
can experience moral dissonance. So can a spouse who believes adultery 
is morally wrong, and receives a blink of an eye from an attractive and 
inviting individual.
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Moral dissonance occurs when there is an absence of what Rawls (1971) 
calls reflective equilibrium. His assumption is that when we make moral 
judgments about a particular issue, we compare them with what we more 
generally consider morally right and wrong in such situations. We seek 
coherence between the moral beliefs about the particular situation and 
the general moral beliefs we have about how one ought to behave in such 
situations. The principle of equality guides us in reflections of this kind, 
as we try to achieve internal balance and equilibrium. When there is a 
breakdown in this attempt to reconcile the particular and the general, we 
can feel and experience moral dissonance.
Temptation is not necessarily involved in moral dissonance. 
Participants in Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority experi-
enced an intense moral discomfort in obeying orders to inflict pain on 
another human being (Milgram 1963, 1974). They, too, faced moral disso-
nance, a clash between their moral convictions and the moral aspect of 
what they were ordered to do.
Who are the people who normally experience moral dissonance? In 
teaching sessions, Nigel Krishna Iyer and I have approached this ques-
tion by placing them in the middle between two kinds of people who are 
not bothered by this particular kind of cognitive dissonance:
The moral saint: A person who hardly ever does anything morally  ▸
wrong and frequently goes beyond moral expectations to be of 
service to others.
The moral cynic: A person who regularly shows a disregard for  ▸
moral considerations in the pursuit of his goals, and shows minimal 
concern for other people’s well-being.
In between these extremes, then, we can find:
The moral doubter: A person who strives to live in accordance with  ▸
his moral beliefs and convictions, but can experience temptations 
to do otherwise.
Wolf (1982) has highlighted the problematic aspects of being a moral 
saint, where being supremely moral is the main life project, overshad-
owing all other projects. Moral saints seem to belittle the activities we 
enjoy for the sake of doing them, where we are not contributing to the 
well-being of others. Neither the moral saint nor the moral cynic are 
bothered much by moral dissonance, the former because the morally 
wrong alternatives seldom or never occur as real options and the latter 
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because he lacks qualms about acting in opposition to ordinary moral 
considerations. It is the moral doubter, who can be genuinely tempted 
to act against his own moral convictions, who can experience moral 
dissonance.
A person experiencing moral dissonance can decide to either reject 
the option that creates the discomfort, or try to convince himself that it 
is morally acceptable to continue after all. It was the second alternative 
Sykes and Matza studied through interviews with juvenile delinquents. 
The five neutralization techniques they identified are as follows:
Denial of responsibility
The decision-maker claims that one or more of the conditions for 
responsible agency are absent. Forces beyond his or her control rule out 
genuine decision-making and the freedom to choose. In business, this 
technique can take the expression of the person presenting himself as 
a pawn on a checkers board, move around by top management or the 
dynamics of the competitive environment. The person claims to act out 
of necessity, and not from free will and personal control. It is a matter of 
survival. Natural forces are at play, and moral criticism makes no more 
sense here than if we were morally critical of a storm, a fight amongst 
animals, or some other natural phenomenon.
Denial of injury
The decision-maker aims to minimize or deny that the act will create any 
harm. This can happen through an appeal to the larger picture, where 
the act in question and its consequences are minor occurrences, soon 
forgotten. It may also be that the negative consequences of the action 
are spread so thinly onto a large number of people, so that no individual 
can reasonably claim that it would have made a notable difference if the 
agent had refrained from acting.
In moral philosophy, Parfit (1984) has discussed the prevalence of 
denial of injury justifications at length, and claims that we are morally 
responsible for the sum of the negative consequences we bring about, 
even when they are individually imperceptible to those affected by our 
conduct. A car user may argue that the negative consequences of the 
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pollution coming from his or her care are spread very thinly on a large 
number of people. Nobody will notice a positive change if this particular 
car user decides to walk or use a bike to work, instead of driving. Thus, 
the car user may argue, there is no point from a pollution perspective to 
quit driving. Parfit disagrees with this line of thinking, and believes that 
it is the sum of negative consequences we are responsible for, irrespec-
tive of whether they are thinly or thickly distributed on other people. 
An individual can cause a considerable amount of injury, even in cases 
where nobody will notice that he or she stops performing the actions 
that have caused them.
Denial of victim
The agent may acknowledge that his actions will have some negative 
impact, but claim that the injured part does not deserve moral protec-
tion. Those who will be affected have only themselves to blame. Either 
they were the ones who started it, or they engage in similar conduct 
themselves or would have done the same if they had been in a position to 
do so. Employees who experience poor treatment from their employers 
often employ this technique when they convince themselves that they 
are not really doing anything wrong when they act against the employer’s 
interest, but rather are restoring justice (Hollinger and Clarke, 1983, 
p. 142). Ariely (2011) has identified a similar phenomenon when inform-
ants who participate in experiments are deliberately treated with some 
degree of disrespect. When they get a chance to cheat, they do so, and 
seem to think that they are entitled to do it, to restore moral balance and 
order.
Even with denial of victim, the Parfit argument regarding distribu-
tion of negative consequences is relevant. It is tempting to say that since 
nobody will notice that I quit driving or stop performing some other 
action that have negative consequences that are imperceptible to the 
individuals experiencing them, there can be no real victim. On Parfit’s 
line of thinking, there are numerous victims, even if none of them will 
notice that you decide to leave the car in the garage.
One Parfit example can serve to illustrate the combination of the 
techniques of denial of injury and denial of victim: In the Bad Old Days, 
each of a thousand torturers inflicted severe pain on one victim. If one 
of them stopped, one victim would experience a complete stop to pain. 
10.1057/9781137532619 - Moral Reasoning at Work, Øyvind Kvalnes
D
ow
n
lo
ad
ed
 fr
o
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 n
pg
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
v
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
15
-1
1-
02
82 Moral Reasoning at Work
DOI: 10.1057/9781137532619.0013
Each of the torturers had to overcome moral dissonance and attempt to 
live with the fact that his or her day’s work had a significant impact on 
one person. Things have now changed and there is now a set of the harm-
less torturers in place. They are still one thousand in number, and they 
have one thousand victims. Each torturer now presses a button, thereby 
turning a switch once on each of a thousand torture instruments. In sum, 
each of the thousand victims suffer the same severe pain, but none of the 
torturers makes any victim’s pain perceptibly worse. Each of them can 
claim with credibility that it would make no perceptible difference to any 
one victim if he or she suddenly refrained from turning the switch. They 
really can claim to be harmless torturers, and individually deny that their 
conduct causes injury to particular victims. Parfit challenges this line of 
argument, claiming that the modern torturers are no less responsible for 
causing pain than their predecessors, although the new setup is more 
sophisticated (Parfit, 1984, p. 80).
Condemnation of the condemners
The decision-maker accuses his or her critics of not understanding the 
dynamics of a particular social practice. He or she can raise doubts about 
their motives for expressing moral criticism in the first place. Moral 
concerns deflect back on the critics. They are the ones with a dubious 
ideological or moral agenda. This technique can be in use when we are 
face-to-face with real critics, or the foil can be an imaginary one.
Appeal to higher loyalties
The decision-maker denies that self-interest motivates the decision 
or act, claiming instead that it honours some other important moral 
obligation. In business, it can typically be loyalties to one’s company, 
colleagues, employer or employees, or to the shareholders. The decision-
maker perceives them to be more important in the current context than 
honesty, fairness or other moral values.
Processes similar to moral neutralization fit under headings like 
moral disengagement (Bandura 1986; Bandura et al. 1996) and self-
serving cognitive distortion (Barriga and Gibbs 1996; Gibbs, Potter, and 
Goldstein, 1995). Ribeaud and Eisner (2010) present an overview of the 
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different approaches, and discuss the extent to which they are overlap-
ping conceptions dealing with the same phenomenon. The general 
question uniting them is: “Through which cognitive processes can an 
individual who is generally rule-abiding and compliant with moral 
standards minimize cognitive dissonance, threats to self-concept, and 
experiences of moral self-sanction when he or she transgresses those 
standards?” (Ribeaud and Eisner, 2010, p. 300). The process in question 
is different from rationalization, in that it takes place prior to the action. 
Ex ante moral neutralization is the mental process that lowers the thresh-
old, allowing the person to act against his or her original moral convic-
tions, while ex post rationalization is the person’s attempt afterwards to 
justify the decision to act that way.
What happens after moral neutralization regarding one kind of behav-
iour has occurred in an organization for the first time? A financial advi-
sor has convinced himself that it is acceptable to recommend structured 
financial products to his clients. From the outset, he had moral qualms 
about recommending them to his customers. The first instance may well 
be the starting point for what Donaldson (2012) has called normalization 
of questionable behaviour. In an analysis of the ethical roots of the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, he describes how “bad practices can become institu-
tionalized, and initial queasiness gives way to industry-wide acceptance” 
(Donaldson, 2012, p. 6). A standard process in an organization, then, can 
have three stages:
Moral dissonance1 
Moral neutralization2 
Normalization of questionable behavior.3 
One significant challenge facing organizations and their managers and 
employees can be to counter and avoid the development of patterns like 
this. They will primarily have to identify and arrest attempts at moral 
neutralization. People can be encouraged to challenge what they see 
as efforts to get out of moral dissonance by using moral neutralization 
techniques.
Do business leaders actually experience moral dissonance and respond 
to it by applying techniques of moral neutralization? Over a three-year 
period (2005–2007), I had the opportunity to explore this topic by 
observing the moral reasoning of business leaders who participated in 
leadership training in a Norwegian financial institution. The program 
consisted of two three-day sessions, and it ran 20 times, with an average 
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of 25 participants each time. A core element in the program, taking up 
one day of the total of six days, was an ethics module. It consisted in 
short introductions to ethical concepts and principles, including the 
Navigation Wheel, and dilemma training sessions, where the participants 
reflected on ethical challenges they could and had encountered in their 
roles as leaders. I have presented the study in further detail elsewhere 
(Kvalnes, 2014), and will recap the main ideas and findings here.
The purpose of having ethics and moral reasoning as an integral part 
of leadership training was to develop the participants’ abilities to reflect 
on and justify their decisions at work. We defined a set of dilemmas in 
advance, based on interviews with experienced leaders within the insti-
tution. The criteria for selecting these dilemmas were that they should 
be relevant and concrete situations which the leaders could expect to 
encounter in their leadership roles.
I served as one of two facilitators in the reflection processes, intro-
ducing the conceptual tools and the dilemmas. When the leaders were 
working with the dilemmas, we observed them and identified structural 
elements in their moral reasoning, both in the small group sessions, and 
in the plenary sessions.
We used a number of different dilemmas during this project. One 
dilemma turned out to be particularly engaging and useful in getting 
the participants to reflect on their moral convictions and their loyalties, 
and that was the reference dilemma from Chapter 2 in this book. What 
should Ben answer in response to inquiries about the social skills of a 
person who is wrecking the working environment in his unit? As noted 
earlier, the situation constitutes a particularly tough leadership challenge 
in a Norway because of the country’s employment legislation. Employees 
have a stronger protection against layoffs than in many other countries. 
Leaders often perceive lying in a reference situation as a last resort to 
instill harmony in the organization or unit.
The participants’ moral reasoning when confronted with the reference 
dilemma constituted data for exploring their use of moral neutralization 
techniques. I studied the extent to which they applied these techniques 
in their moral reasoning.
Moral neutralization occurred in the justification and reasoning of many 
of the participants in the leadership training. When confronted with the 
reference dilemma many reported that they experienced moral dissonance. 
On the one hand, they felt an obligation to be transparent and honest, 
but on the other hand, they were tempted to be less than fully truthful 
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when interviewed about the employee’s social skills. In the dilemma train-
ing sessions, they had to make a decision. Most participants decided to 
be truthful in the reference situation, at the cost of being stuck with the 
employee and having to deal with the social problems in the unit. Those 
who chose to withhold information about the employees involvement in 
social unrest tried to justify that alternative to themselves and others, by 
using expressions that fit under the moral neutralization techniques.
Denial of responsibility
The participants who decided to conceal parts of the truth about the 
employee appealed to a lack of a real choice to do otherwise. They 
claimed that the tough competitive marked made it necessary to tell 
lies. Some passed responsibility and blame onto their superiors in the 
company. They were the people who demanded quick and effective fixes 
to social instability at work. Those who were unwilling to do sacrifice 
honesty for efficiency risked losing their jobs. Among the claims the 
participants used were:
It is the Iron Law of business. ▸
I must take the opportunity to relieve tension in my unit. ▸
Let us not fool ourselves. Everybody does it. It is the unwritten rule  ▸
of the game.
The forces of competition leave me with no choice. ▸
Somebody has to do the morally dirty work around here. It is a  ▸
necessity.
The protection against layoffs is unreasonable, and forces us to take  ▸
other measures.
Expressions like this have the common feature that they diminish or 
remove ordinary moral responsibility for the decision-making process. 
The leader is a pawn with restricted freedom for choose, rather than a 
responsible decision-maker.
Denial of injury
Some participants claimed that lying in the reference situation was not 
really a serious moral problem, because the other organization would 
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be resourceful and stable enough to accommodate the socially difficult 
person. They would have the capacity to adjust to the situation, and to 
put the employee on a more constructive path:
They have a good HR department with staff who are used to  ▸
helping people onto a better path.
He will be only one of several hundred employees. Surely, they will  ▸
find ways to cope with him and minimize trouble.
Denial of injury also took the form of appealing to moral obligations to 
the employee. The main thrust of this argument was that the leader owed 
it to the employee to help him along the way to a job where he would do 
better.
A change of environment will do him good. ▸
He may flourish in their organization. ▸
Why should I stand in his way and destroy his future? ▸
Our perception of him as difficult to work with is subjective and  ▸
biased.
Let us not be judgmental and put a negative label on a fellow  ▸
human being.
Rather than cause injury, then, the act of deception in the reference situ-
ation would create opportunities for a better future for the employee.
The appeals to the wellbeing of the employee exemplify how moral 
neutralization techniques can build on considerations that, under some 
circumstances, may provide the basis for legitimate justifications (Heath 
2008; p. 602). It may indeed be the case that a person who people perceive 
to be socially difficult in one organization will flourish in a new working 
environment, and deserves a chance to do so. In moral neutralization, the 
decision-maker stretches this argument to the level of incredulity. It can 
be more likely that the employee will cause similar difficulties in a new 
job, and the business leader who tells himself otherwise in order to make 
it possible to lie, is engaged in neutralization through denial of injury.
Denial of victim
Participants in the dilemma training also followed the pattern of this 
neutralization technique. The underlying assumption seemed to be that 
more or less everybody in business behaves in this way. As noted above, 
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moral transgression can be justified by appeal to restoring moral order. 
The other party should not be seen as a victim, since they have behaved 
badly themselves (Hollinger and Clarke, 1983, p. 142). One scholarly 
participant in our training sessions made the Machiavellian claim that a 
business leader needs to consider the world as it really is, not as it ought 
to be. He saw lying in the reference situation as the choice of the realistic 
and pragmatic leader, rather than the idealistic and principled one, who 
chose to think in terms of what the business world ought to be like. Some 
of the claims under this heading were:
They would have done the same to us. They probably already have. ▸
They know the rules of the game. ▸
Why should we take the moral high ground? Nobody else will. ▸
Let us not be naïve and think that we can survive on honesty. ▸
The common feature of these claims is that the organization making the 
inquiry about the employee is far too robust to be a proper victim. They 
are likely to treat the information they get from a reference interview 
with some suspicion anyway, the leaders argued. If they fail to do so, and 
end up making an unsound recruitment, it is their own fault. Denial of 
victim was a technique frequently used by the leaders who attempted to 
neutralize the option of lying in the reference situation.
Condemnation of the condemners.
In the face of criticism for their choice, some participants responded by 
turning the table on the critics, questioning their motivation for being 
opposed to pragmatic approach to the reference situation.
They don’t understand the dynamics of capitalism ▸
I can smell socialism here. ▸
People are making a career out of moralizing about business. ▸
They have no idea about what it is like to run a profitable company. ▸
If they had been in our shoes, they would have done the same. ▸
Of the five neutralization techniques, this one was the least frequent one 
in use by the participants. One explanation for this can be that there were 
no actual condemners or critics present. Some participants introduced 
the idea of what others would have said if told about the act of withhold-
ing information, but the moral reasoning seldom took this turn.
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Appeal to higher loyalties
The participants appealed to two kinds of moral obligations, one to the 
individual who was seeking a new job, and one to one’s own unit or 
organization. They expressed moral concern for the employee who would 
never get out of his current stalemate if nobody provided some assistance 
on the way and for their unit where the quality of the social interaction 
and cooperation was under threat. The former claims were similar to 
some of the ones placed under the Denial of injury category above:
He deserves another chance. ▸
It would be unfair to destroy his opportunities to start up a new  ▸
career elsewhere.
Let us show some concern for his family and the people who rely  ▸
on his income.
He has worked himself into a corner, and needs assistance to get  ▸
out of it.
The latter claims pointed to the moral obligation that comes with the 
position of being a business leader:
I am primarily loyal to the company and my unit. ▸
Normally, I would not lie, but I make exceptions in situations where  ▸
I can relieve my unit of a considerable burden.
This company is where I got my career breakthrough. I must give  ▸
something back.
I have an obligation to make sure things run smoothly here. ▸
Appeals to higher loyalty, then, took the form both of expressing a moral 
obligation towards the employee, and a moral obligation towards one’s 
organization. In both cases, the claims have the appearance of genuine 
moral justifications, but are weak in credibility, since they sanction the 
use of dishonesty to transport a problem from one’s own organization 
onto another organization.
The dilemma training sessions confirmed that moral neutralization 
techniques belong to the moral reasoning repertoire of business lead-
ers. Participants who decided to keep parts of their opinions about the 
employee to themselves all engaged in neutralization in their internal 
considerations about what to do in the reference situation. They were 
able to talk themselves into believing that is was morally acceptable to lie 
or keep quiet about the employee’s social skills.
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The main conclusion I draw from the study of the moral reasoning 
of business leaders when confronted with the reference dilemma is that 
the concept of moral neutralization is very relevant for understanding 
how people in organizations can overcome moral dissonance and end 
up acting against their initial moral convictions. Ariely (2012) has a 
name for what happens when the original moral misgivings concerning 
a particular option disappears: The what-the-hell-effect. Once the moral 
resistance has gone, the road lies open for new routines and practices. 
The following quote from Tyler Hamilton’s book about being a cyclist 
in Lance Armstrong’s team illustrates the mentality we can find on the 
other side of the fence:
You could have hooked us up to the best lie detectors on the planet and asked 
us if we were cheating, and we’d have passed. Not because we were delusional, 
but because we didn’t think of it as cheating. It felt fair to break the rules. 
(Hamilton and Coyle, 2012)
It is hard to say whether Hamilton and the others ever experienced 
significant moral dissonance before engaging in doping, but here at least 
any traces of moral misgivings about competing under the influence 
of performance-enhancing drugs have disappeared. Hamilton and the 
others felt that is was fair to break the rules.
Those who are responsible for and concerned about ethics in organi-
zations should take heed of how (1) moral dissonance can disappear 
through processes of (2) moral neutralization, which can pave the way 
for a (3) normalization of questionable behaviour. People can be familiar 
with the Navigation Wheel and the whole array of ethical theories, prin-
ciples, and concepts and still be vulnerable to developments of this kind. 
Excellent analytical skills does not offer protection against becoming 
involved in neutralization processes. Maybe there are individuals of firm 
and stable character who are better equipped to resist invitations to use 
moral neutralization techniques than others are. Within an organiza-
tion the main countermeasures against the (1) to (3) development is to 
encourage people to speak up and confront colleagues who appear to be 
engaged in moral neutralization. This is all about what kinds of justifica-
tions and excuses you can get away with at work.
To be the one offering resistance to a leader or a colleague’s neutraliza-
tion attempts takes courage, and can be intensely unpleasant. In many 
instances, people will interpret it as an unwanted disruption of a process 
that is in good flow. Why spoil the path towards higher profits and better 
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margins for the organization? When a person has been brave enough 
to voice his or her moral concerns in such a context, all eyes will be on 
that person for some time. Colleagues will be eager to see what happens 
next in that person’s career. Was it a wise move, or one that the person 
receives punishment for, in the form of remaining on the same step on 
the career ladder, or having to take steps down? The answer exposes the 
kind of communication climate there is in the organization for stopping 
moral neutralization in its track.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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The Invisible Gorilla
Abstract: Concentration on a particular task can take 
away our ability to attend to important nuances of a 
situation. Aspects that are supremely notable and present 
to outsiders can be invisible to the hard working and deeply 
concentrated insiders. This chapter argues that moral 
blindness in organizations can occur when people develop 
routine ways of looking at things and gradually fail to see 
moral aspects of their own conduct. Workplace incentives 
have a significant impact on how employees see reality in 
their organizations, and can make moral dimensions of the 
activity become blurred and invisible. Generous bonuses can 
speed up moral neutralization and make initial misgivings 
about goals and methods at work disappear from view. Even 
people with excellent abilities in ethical analysis and with the 
most dependable and stable character traits are vulnerable 
in this respect. A crucial element in ethics in organizations 
should therefore be to establish communication climates 
that encourage people to speak up when they observe what 
appears to be morally dubious conduct in their own working 
environment.
Kvalnes, Øyvind. Moral Reasoning at Work: Rethinking 
Ethics in Organizations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137532619.0014.
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On a day when I was working on this book, I got a phone call from a 
woman who wanted me to contribute with a presentation on an ethics 
day in her organization. Her idea was to make leaders and employees in 
the organization familiar with the Navigation Wheel and other ethical 
tools and principles. I was willing to contribute, but had to check my 
calendar first. It turned out that I had an appointment for that particular 
day, to hold an ethics talk in another organization, so regrettably I had to 
say no to the invitation. When the woman heard this news, she hesitated 
for a brief moment, before she said: “What if we pay you a bit extra to 
come to us?” To my astonishment, she offered to pay me for breaking the 
promise of giving an ethics talk in one organization, in order to come 
and give an ethics talk in her workplace instead. I responded by asking 
her to think through that offer one more time, and consider whether she 
meant it seriously. It did not take her long to realize how inappropriate 
her suggestion was, particularly in the light of the topic of the seminar 
day. She had just been so eager to get the program for the day in place, 
with me as one of the contributors. For a moment, she had been blind 
to the moral aspect of the situation, and suggested something that she 
realized on second thought was out of the question.
Moral blindness is something that can strike any decision-maker in an 
organization. We have complex tasks and are supposed to deal with them 
quickly in order to be ready for further challenges at work. In the heat of 
the moment, we can become blind to important aspect of the situation. 
The perception psychologists Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons 
have made a short film to illustrate how our attention in a given situation 
is selective and vulnerable to manipulation (Chabris and Simons, 2010). 
The film shows six people, three of them in white clothes and three of 
them in black clothes, walking around in circles while they are passing 
basketballs to each other. Each team has one basketball, and the team 
members pass it amongst each other while they are constantly on the 
move. The assignment to the film’s audience is to count the number of 
times the team wearing white manages to pass the basketball to each 
other. Those who really concentrate on the task come up with the correct 
answer, which is 15. A facilitator then asks if they noticed anything else 
during the film, and some say that they saw a black figure walking across 
the screen. To check this observation, the film runs one more time, and 
on this occasion, everybody can see the big gorilla figure walking slowly 
into the frame, stopping in the middle of it, banging its chest, and then 
moving slowly out of the picture. The gorilla takes up a lot of space, and 
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the people who are blind to it on the first showing find it difficult to 
believe that it can be the same film.
I have used the gorilla film in many settings in organizations, to 
illustrate the limitations of our ability to attend to nuances and details 
of a situation. I have shown the film to audiences where nobody sees 
any trace of a black figure first time around, and have been accused of 
showing two different film clips. Normally, I have at least one witness 
who glimpsed the gorilla the first time, and can vouch for the fact that 
it is the same film. When I add a competitive edge, and tell the audience 
that another group was particularly successful in getting the number of 
passes right, people focus even more intently on the counting, and fewer 
people see anything resembling a gorilla.
The invisible gorilla can function as a symbol of significant aspects of 
our own working environment that we can become blind to in our effort 
to perform complex tasks with a tight time schedule. Some of these 
aspects can be morally significant. We can be morally blind due to the 
complexity of the situation and the demands that are put on us, and also 
as a result of economic and other incentives. Bird (1996, p. 85) defines 
moral blindness in the following way: “People are morally blind when 
they fail to see or recognize moral concerns and expectations that bear 
upon their activities and involvements.” This is a different form of blind-
ness than the one mentioned in the introduction to this book, where 
somebody deliberately adopts the position of wilful blindness, turning 
a blind eye to the case at hand, not wanting to know details. Gorilla 
blindness occurs involuntarily, as a result of our limited perception 
capacities. Conflict of interest issues can typically become invisible to 
us, as high personal ambitions can make self-interest overshadow client 
interest. Airely’s physician appears to have become morally blind in this 
manner, in his efforts to convince a third patient to take the treatment 
he wanted to discuss in an academic paper. Financial advisors in many 
countries appeared to lose sight of client interest prior to the financial 
crisis, making it possible for them to recommend and sell questionable 
products, without experiencing moral dissonance. Moral blindness can 
occur in any organization, including institutions where people research 
and teach on the topic of ethics in organizations.
One of the paths to moral blindness goes through the process of moral 
neutralization, where the decision-maker convinces him- or herself to 
leave behind initial moral misgivings about a particular option. Once a 
person or an environment has crossed that hurdle, it seems difficult to 
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return to the state where the option in question seemed morally dubious. 
The moral aspects we could see from the old perspective is now invis-
ible, like the gorilla in Simons and Chabris’ film. Hamilton and Coyle 
(2012) has described how individuals in a tight and loyal collective like 
the cycling team of Lance Armstrong, can strengthen each other’s firm 
beliefs that their cheating behaviour is beyond reasonable reproach.
Organizations that are serious about ethics depend on a communica-
tion climate where the normal response when an employee has moral 
doubts about a course of action, is for him or her to speak up and address 
the issue. When deciding to voice a moral concern, the employee should 
ideally not experience fear over what comes next in terms of possible 
negative sanctions from colleagues and leadership. Moral muteness 
(Bird, 1996; Bird and Waters, 1989) can be a feature in organizations 
where people are afraid to speak their minds on moral matters: “Many 
people hold moral convictions yet fail to verbalize them. They remain 
silent out of deference to the judgements of others, out of fear that their 
comments will be ignored, or out of uncertainty that what they might 
have to say is really not that important” (Bird 1996, p. 1). Individuals in 
organization can have the impression that they are alone in having moral 
misgivings about how their workplace operates. They can be unaware 
that colleagues in the same unit actually share their moral concerns, 
since they never raise the issue and address the topic collectively.
It is in this context that the category of relational moral luck, briefly 
introduced in chapter four, makes good sense. A decision-maker can be 
fortunate or unfortunate with the people who are in the social surround-
ings at the crucial moment when he or she is about to respond to a 
moral dilemma – whether it be a real or false one. That particular social 
environment can be one where people naturally challenge and support 
each other critically in such situations, or one where nobody lifts an 
eyelid when a colleague enters into morally questionable territory. It is 
not merely due to luck whether you are in one or the other of these kinds 
of surroundings, as we do make decisions about the kind of organization 
we want to work in and belong to. However, the communication climate 
of the workplace might be something that we only gradually become 
aware of, and coincidences and luck can definitely play a part in deciding 
if we end up with colleagues who care enough to intervene, or not.
Two phenomena identified in social psychology highlight how crucial 
it can be to establish a constructive communication climate in organi-
zations. They are relevant for judgement and decision-making in the 
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workplace beyond ethics. Confirmation bias is the tendency we have to 
notice and seek information that confirms our beliefs, and to be inatten-
tive to information that provides us with reasons to change our beliefs. 
The phenomenon is well documented in research (Nickerson, 1998), and 
produces formidable challenges in many professions. Police investigators 
can make up their minds about which person has committed a crime, 
and only pursue and notice information that confirms that conclusion. 
Teachers can have preconceptions about the intelligence and abilities 
of their pupils, and fail to see upward and downward spirals in their 
developments. Researchers can be so satisfied with their hypotheses and 
explanations of phenomena that they become blind to glaring counter-
evidence and reasons to revise them. In these and other professions, 
knowledge about confirmation bias is part of the professional training. 
This is nevertheless a pervasive decision-making trap, and one that 
emphasizes the need to have communication climates where colleagues 
look out for each other and intervene when someone at work stubbornly 
holds on to one belief or viewpoint rather than revises it in the light of 
new and relevant information.
The other psychological phenomenon that can slow down a process 
of identifying and addressing morally relevant aspects of behaviour in 
an organization is the bystander effect. Research on human behaviour in 
real situations and in experiments show that the greater the number of 
bystanders to an event where somebody needs help, the less likely is it 
that any one of them will actually help (Darley and Latané, 1968; Hudson 
and Bruckman, 2004). One cause for this effect seems to be that we 
consider responsibility to help in a situation to be one unit that we share 
evenly with the other people at the scene. If we are one hundred bystand-
ers to a critical situation, we seem unconsciously to split responsibility 
into one hundred tiny pieces, leaving each of us with one hundredth of a 
responsibility to intervene and help. That is a very small piece of respon-
sibility. If we instead are fifty bystanders, the responsibility is double that 
of in the previous situation, but one fiftieth of a responsibility is still very 
little. This way of thinking is what Derek Parfit labels mistakes in moral 
mathematics. We do have individual responsibilities to help, no matter 
how many others are present. It is unreasonable to consider responsibil-
ity to be one cake we share evenly into thin slices. Each has his or her 
own cake of responsibility.
Another cause for the bystander effect is that each of us tend to inter-
pret the inactivity of the others as a sign that nothing serious is going on, 
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and that there is no reason to engage. From my perspective, it looks like 
the man is hurt and needs help, but nobody else in the crowd appears 
to think so. My initial judgment of the situation appears to be wrong, 
since everybody else is passive. I might be too sensitive in my interpreta-
tion, overdramatizing the situation in my head. It looks like a gorilla, 
but nobody else shows any sign of seeing it, so perhaps it is an illusion. 
The strength of this tendency to doubt one’s own evaluations tends to be 
proportionate to the number of bystanders.
The bystander effect is relevant for ethics in organizations in that the 
number of people who perceive that there is something morally wrong 
with the setup of a particular project, with the relationships with the 
suppliers, or with the new products or sales methods, affects the likeli-
hood that anybody will take initiatives to be critical of them. Even here, it 
is probable that the higher the number of bystanders, the lower the like-
lihood of an intervention. It may be that knowledge about the bystander 
effect can weaken it, as suggested by Mele and Sheperd (2013). It is thus 
worthwhile to make leaders and employees in organizations aware of it, 
for reasons that go beyond ethics. It is also possible to counter the effect 
by delegating responsibility to particular individuals. If you need help 
and are surrounded by bystanders, you should point to one person and 
ask for help, rather than shout for help in the general direction of every-
one. Addressing one person directly with a call for help has the positive 
double effect of both (1) disrupting the mistake in moral mathematics of 
splitting responsibility up in tiny pieces, and of (2) accentuating that the 
situation really is as serious as it looks.
Maria Gentile has developed the concept of Giving Voice to Values 
(GVV) as a method for individuals at work to stand up for their moral 
beliefs and values, even when they are under pressure from colleagues, 
leaders, customers, and other stakeholders not to do so (Gentile, 2010). 
GVV has generated considerable research interest (Cote, Goodstein, and 
Latham, 2011; Chappell, Edwards, and Webb, 2013; Edwards and Kirkham, 
2014) and also inspired practitioners in organizations. It encourages 
people to overcome moral muteness and speak their minds when they 
observe decision-making and conduct that goes against their moral 
values. It also provides concrete action plans and scripts for people who 
want to become better at giving voice to their values at work. In many 
ways, GVV seems designed to address the needs I have identified in this 
book, to intervene when colleagues engage in moral neutralization and 
gradually become blind to moral aspects of their own behaviour.
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There is much to commend and admire in Gentile’s approach, but I 
have one reservation. The subtitle of the GVV book is “How to speak 
your mind when you know what’s right” and the tone of actually know-
ing what is right is prevalent in the discussion. Gentile offers practical 
advice to individuals who clearly see how things stand, and what it will 
mean to stand up for one’s values in the situation, and need to go from 
conviction to enactment. Research on the bystander effect and similar 
phenomena indicate that people are often in situations where they do 
not know what is right, but have doubts about how to interpret what 
is enfolding in front of them. They somehow need to give voice to that 
doubt, and not remain passive. The starting position of being a person 
who knows full well what is right and true does not invite dialogue or 
attention to how other people see the situation. It is not the position of 
listening to other perspectives and being open to revise one’s beliefs. The 
label for my alternative approach, then, would be giving voice to doubt 
rather than value, since I believe uncertainty and doubt to be a more 
constructive starting point for conversations about right and wrong 
than one where we have made up our minds in advance. One frame of 
reference can be that of Socratic dialogue, where the aim is to engage in 
inquiry and questioning in order to reach consensus on an issue. The 
philosophers Nelson (1949) and Heckman (1981) have suggested a design 
inspired by the idea of Socratic dialogue, where search for truth in 
answer to a particular question is undertaken in common. Brinkmann 
(2015) proposes a similar approach as a catalyst in conversations about 
right and wrong in organizations. In essence, the Socratic design invites 
respect for the myriad of perspectives that deserve a hearing when we 
try to reach a common understanding a particular situation (Brinkmann 
et al., forthcoming).
My aim with this book has been to suggest ways to rethink ethics in 
organizations. I have argued from research streams in moral philosophy 
and in moral psychology, as well as from my own experiences as an 
ethics facilitator in organizations. Decision-makers in organizations, 
both leaders and employees, face moral dilemmas where they need to 
give appropriate weight to legal, ethical, moral, reputational, economic, 
and value based aspects of the situation. They cannot rely solely on 
moral intuition or gut feeling – Kahneman’s system 1 thinking – but also 
need to be able to analyse the situation carefully – Kahneman’s system 2 
thinking. The combination of good analytical skills and stable character 
can make an individual well equipped to meet moral dilemmas, but 
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we also know from studies in social psychology and criminology that 
more or less anybody can become entangled in moral wrongdoing, given 
the right circumstances. In organizations, we depend upon colleagues 
to intervene and stop us when ambition and other factors tempt us to 
take moral shortcuts. It can be enough that they raise doubts about the 
path we are contemplating, since that gives us reasons to rethink and 
reschedule. Ethics in organizations can build on a rich array of research 
and knowledge, from well beyond the traditional sources of moral 
philosophy. Doing so can make the workplaces less vulnerable to the 
unpredictable and erratic activities of invisible gorillas.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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